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at The Chinese University of Hong Kong in October 2003 
This essay is a study of the problem of meaning in the philosophy of language. The 
central question I ask is: Can a single speaker determine the meaning of a linguistic 
expression by herself, or does the process of determining meaning require the involve-
ment of at least two parties? The thesis I examine is that the determination of the meaning 
of a linguistic expression involves two or more parties—the sociality thesis. This thesis 
call be stated in a more specific manner, specifying the details on how various parties are 
involved in the determination process. With a presupposition that use theories are more 
likely to be the correct theory of meaning, I present in the essay four different specific 
senses of the sociality thesis, they are namely the contractarian view, the uniform 
response view, the background information view and the communication view. I find 
that none of the four views can answer satisfactorily all the objections it faces. 
Therefore, none supports the sociality thesis convincingly. Thus I conclude that the 
thesis is untenable. However, I also take note of two critical factors bearing on the social 
nature of meaning. First, to introduce the condition of "normal circumstance," in which 
the discussion of meaning emphasises normal cases rather than unusual cases, and 
second, to understand 'involvement' not in the direct sense (that is, the actual presence 
of other people), but as an indirect relation to others (that is, the consideration of the 
potential presence of others when explaining why the determination of meaning is 
possible). If I qualify the sociality thesis by specifying that 'social' refers to normal 
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1.1 Domain of Study and Its Significance 
This essay is a study of the problem of meaning in the philosophy of language. Since the 
problem is complex and this essay is short, only a few aspects of the problem will be 
discussed. The central question of the essay is: Can a single speaker determine the 
meaning of a linguistic expression by herself, or does the process of determining 
meaning require at least two parties?' I will refer to the view that two or more parties 
must be involved as the sociality thesis. 
The problem of meaning has occupied the central position in philosophy of 
language for a long time产 Dummett said in an 1987 interview that the fundamental idea 
11 would like to clarify the central question in four respects. First, meaning need not be limited 
to linguistic meaning, as there are meanings from natural objects, events as well as artificial 
signs. This essay just focuses on linguistic meaning. Second, I consider in this essay a 
linguistic expression as a word or a sentence used by a speaker in a practical setting in daily 
communication. Third,丨 follow the practice in pragmatics of referring to the speaker of an 
example as she and the hearer as he. And last, the case of speaking something also 
corresponds to the parallel case that a linguistic expression is written by an agent. Thus, the 
argument for a speaker also corresponds to the argument tor the case of a writer. 
2 The history of the subject can be best reviewed by having a look at the editors' introductions 
to four widely read anthologies ranging between 1967 and 1997. Rorty wrote in 1965 for the 
influential anthology The Linguistic Turn that the "most recent philosophical revolution" is 
linguistic philosophy. (Rorty, 1992:3) Searle (1971) was echoing Rorty's upbeat opinion when 
he wrote, "[I]n the spread of analytical philosophy in the twentieth century the philosophy of 
language has occupied such a central, some would say the central, place in the entire 
enterprise of philosophy." (p. 1) 
But Rorty himself said a quarter of century later, "[T]he controversies which I discussed with 
such earnestness in 1965 already seemed quaint in 1975. By now [1990] they seem positively 
antique." (Rorty, 1992: 371) While Searle's primary concern shitted from philosophy of 
language to philosophy mind as he wrote, "A basic assumption behind my approach to 
problems of language is that the philosophy of language is a branch of the philosophy of 
mind." (Searle, 1983: vii) 
Ludlow (1997), another editor of a newer anthology, reviews this change of fad vwth the benefit 
of hindsight as he wrote that his friends "have complained that the philosophy of language has 
become moribund or has been eclipsed by the philosophy of mind." (p. xv) But Ludlow 
believes that philosophy of language "is entering an exciting period—one in which how we 
conduct philosophy of language could change in fundamental ways." (Ibid) Ludlow's confident 
remark was shared by another anthology editor A. P. Martinich, who claimed that philosophy of 
language is important and interesting because it leads to deeper understandings of human 
characteristics, philosophical problems and reality. He added, "[L]anguage is interesting in 
itself and might be studied profitably for its own sake." (Martinich, 1990:3-4) 
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of analytic philosophy is the analysis of thought through the analysis of language (Pyle, 
1999: 2)，3 and he once remarked that metaphysical disputes depend on the theory of 
meaning. (Dumniett, 1991: 18) 
One way of studying the problem of meaning is to put forward a theory of meaning 
to explain "what it is in virtue of which a string of marks and noises has the distinctive 
meaning it does." (Lycan, 1999: 2) Use theories are one attempt to do so and section 1.3 
below will review this type of theoiy and compare it with other theories of meaning. But 
to start, let me point out that my essay is written with a presupposition that meaning is 
determined chiefly by the everyday use of expressions in practical settings/ 
Presuming a background of use theories of meaning in the Anglo-American 
tradition, this essay focuses on the relation between the determination of meaning and 
the speakers) who use meaningful expressions. I will explain more clearly in the next 
section (on central statement) exactly which part of the relation will be the focus of the 
essay. 
The question of whether meaning can be determined by a single speaker may lead 
the reader to think that tiiis essay will revisit the private language problem. I do employ a 
private language argument at the outset of my examination of various senses of the 
sociality thesis. But the argument is formulated in such a way as to highlight those 
elements which I think will relate closely to the thesis in the later sections of the essay. 
And this essay will discuss quite a few other issues beyond the private language 
3 References used in this essay are of the form (Pyle, 1999:2), Pyle is the author (or editor) of 
the book or article published in 1999, the quote is in page two. Full publishing information is 
listed in the References section at the end of the essay. 
4 Although I do not deny that meanings also involve referential relations between linguistic 
expressions and objects in the world’ this qualification does not affect what is going to be 
argued in the following chapters. 
® The study of philosophy of language is of course not limited to the Anglo-American tradition 
of western philosophy. In the Continental tradition for instance, the philosophical study of 
language in the modem period dated at least back to Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913), a 
contemporary of Gottlob Frege (1848-1925). A present-day Saussure scholar praises that 
"Saussure ushers in what was subsequently described as a 'Copemican revolution" in Western 
linguistic thought." (Harris and Taylor, 1997:210) Saussure's structuralist ideas on language 
was transmitted chiefly through Jakobson and Derrida. (see Joseph, Love and Taylor, 2001: 
ch. 2,13) But this essay will skip the ideas of this tradition, except those from the German 
philosopher Jurgen Habermas as his view is a development from Searle's speech acts theory, 
(see especially Habermas, 1984: section III) 
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problem. 
The sociality thesis is interesting because rejecting a private language prompts us to 
consider whether what a person means must be understood either actually or potentially 
by another person. The chief task of ihis essay is to examine a few major hypotheses 
about how this other person is (or should be) related to the process of determining 
meaning. 
1.2 Central Statement 
The thesis I am going to examine is that the determination of the meaning of a linguistic 
expression involves two or more parties. This statement I will call the sociality thesis, 
the general thesis’ or the sociality thesis in the general sense. I call any more concrete 
way of stating how two or more parties are involved in the determination process a 
specific sense of the sociality thesis. The general sense is a more abstract way of stating 
the thesis, while a specific sense is more concrete. 
In chapter two and three, I will discuss four specific senses of the sociality thesis. 
These are views on which meaning is determined by: (a) prior agreement, (b) imiform 
responses, (c) background information, and finally (d) distinct perspectives during 
communication. 
These different views are not intended to form a group of parallel arguments for 
one specific sense of the sociality thesis. Rather, they are a succession of different 
views for different specific senses, linked together in such a way that the later views 
comment on or even rebut the previous ones. Furthermore, I will distinguish clearly the 
parts of each view representing a certain hypothetical position, from the parts 
representing my own position. 
I would also like to note briefly that in these views, speakers are sometimes 
understood as directly involved in determining meanings, and in other times as indirectly 
6 A few words on "determine". Since this essay takes use theories as the theory of meaning, I 
consider that the meaning of a linguistic expression will be determined if the conditions of 
applications of the expression are clearly laid out. Such conditions of applications can be 
regarded as the rules of usage tor that particular linguistic expression. I argue in the essay that 
such rules cannot be set up arbitrarily, but in fact delimited by facts of nature (to be discussed in 
depth in section 3.3) and inferential relations between the sentences (to be discussed in 
depth in section 3.4). This does not imply that meaning is determinate, in a sense that would 
assume Quine's indeterminacy thesis is false. 
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involved. Such a difference may seem insignificant but turns out to be decisive by the 
end of the essay. Ultimately, I will reject all the views with direct involvement, while 
affirming those with indirect involvement. The crucial point is that only through views 
of such indirect involvement can the general sense of the sociality thesis be sustained, 
though in a qualified way. This will be the main conclusion of the essay. 
1.3 Preliminaries 
This section presents in three parts some preliminary remarks that set the stage for the 
essay. The first two parts will explain, on the one hand, how other theories of meaning 
are so problem-laden that they may not be viable theories of meaning; and, on the other 
hand, that use theories face fewer difficulties and fare better when encountering 
challenges. Therefore, the latter kind of theory is chosen as the background of the thesis. 
The third part of the section will identify several senses of ihe term 'social' that will 
not be discussed in the essay. Since this section is a preliminary discussion, not the 
central focus of the essay, it will be relatively brief. 
1.3.1 Other Theories of Meaning^ 
1. The first type of theory of meaning attempts to reify linguistic meaning as some sort 
of actual entity. Typical examples are referential theories, according to which meaning is 
identified with actual objects in this world, and ideational theories, according to which 
meaning is identified with ideas in our heads. 
The crux of referential theories is that linguistic expressions have meanings in 
virtue of the fact that they stand for actual objects in this world. This type of view 
became known as the Augustinian view because Wittgenstein (1958) attributed such a 
view to Augustine in the first section of his Philosophical Investigations. 
One problem with such theories is that not every word we use stands for a real 
object For example, the name 'Santa Claus’ is meaningful but this figure is not real. 
The case is similar for abstract nouns like ‘concept,’ 'history' or 'happiness' and for 
7 Please note that 丨 am not going to discuss in detail the structure, strength and weakness of 
each theory of meaning because it is beyond both the focus of this essay as well as my 
capability. 
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connectives like ‘or，’ ‘if .. • then ... ’，etc.，which are not only meaningful but also 
indispensable in speech. These connectives do not stand for any object, but just fill 
grammatical functions. 
The strongest argument against the referential view comes from Frege (1892: 193). 
Since two terms such as 'morning star' and 'evening star' have different meanings, 
according to the referential theory they must stand for different objects. But in fact both 
terms stand for the same star. Therefore the idea that a meaning can be identified simply 
with an actual object must be mistaken. 
A defender of referential theories may say that linguistic expressions themselves do 
not refer to objects; it is speakers who use these expressions to refer to certain objects in 
particular contexts, while the relation between expressions and objects, which is 
abstract, is called denotation，Thus a speaker may employ different expressions (with 
different meanings) to refer to the same object. 
This distinction between reference and denotation carries with it its own difficulties. 
First, denotation faces problems similar to those just mentioned: some words do not 
denote any object, but only fill grammatical functions, some denote abstract things, etc. 
Second, such an explication of the theory requires an explanation of how the speaker 
performs the activity of referring. This kind of explanation will then shift the explanatory 
focus from the abstract relation of denotation between expressions and objects to the 
linguistic (or linguistically-related) act performed by the speakers using those 
expressions. So it points us towards some form of use theory of meaning. 
2. Another way to reify meaning as an actual entity is to propose that the meanings of 
linguistic expressions are tiie ideas (a kind of mental state) they stand for . Thus, two 
expressions are identical in meaning whenever they express the same idea, which may 
be held by different people. While language is an instrument for reporting such ideas or 
strings of ideas. 
8 This point is contrasted vividly in two seminal papers: Russell (1905) sajd,"... denoting 
phrases express a meaning and denote a denotation..." While Strawson (1950) said, "We 
very commonly use expressions of certain kinds to mention or refer to some individual person 
or single object or particular event or place or process..." 
9 Since this idea originated from Locke (1690) Essay Concerning Human Understanding, such 
a type of theory of meaning is also known as Lockean theories. 
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However, ideas and linguistic meanings cannot be identical. One reason is that 
ideas are much more concrete than meanings. When you think of a cat, the idea must be 
about a cat of a particular breed, size, fur colour, etc. But the meaning of the word 'cat' 
does not include such details. Furthermore，it is also hard to imagine what kinds of 
mental state correspond to the linguistic expressions 'furthermore', ‘is，，'also', ‘to，， 
'what', 'mental states', etc. 
In addition to these objections, the definition of ideas requires as much explanation 
as meanings do. Is an idea a memory? An imagination? An image? Or something else? 
Any ideational theory must provide some satisfactory answer to this query before a 
convincing account of meaning can be established. 
The most critical difficulty for ideational theories is probably the "match-up 
problem". The problem is that ideas and words do not stand in one-one correspondence. 
Any idea a person might think of could quite reasonably connect to several words; 
conversely, a particular word could bring to various hearers' minds different ideas. For 
example, the idea of a cup of tea may reasonably be associated with words like ‘milk’， 
'hot', 'relaxing', 'exotic', etc. The word 'relaxing' may in turn be associated with ideas 
of a cup of hot tea, soothing music, aromatic therapy, etc. As a result, when a speaker 
wants to bring forward a particular idea by uttering a certain word, she has no guarantee 
that upon hearing the utterance the hearer will come up with that same particular idea in 
his mind. In short, with respect to the same word, what a speaker means by it may not 
be the same as the meaning a hearer grasps. This presents a serious problem for 
ideational theories to explain how meanings (ideas in our head) can be fixed during 
communication with words. 
To sum up, referential theories and ideational theories tend to consider words, not 
sentences, as the basic units of meaning. They also tend to view meanings of words as 
just labels for actual things, objects in referential theories and ideas in ideational theories. 
Both types of theories encounter a host of daunting problems, perhaps indicating that 
both the notion of words as the basic units of communication and that of meaning as 
labelling are ill-considered. 
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3. Other approaches to devising a theory of meaning avoid reifying meanings as actual 
entities. Proposilional theories and truth-conditional theories are two such approaches. 
Let us begin with prepositional theories. These ttieories hold that the meaning of a 
sentence is identified with the proposition it expresses. A proposition can be regarded as 
what is expressed in (or the content of) a sentence and is capable of being true or false?� 
No matter how defined, a proposition is generally regarded as an abstract entity 
independent of what people think. Hence, to understand what a sentence means is to 
grasp the abstract proposition it expresses. Let me illustrate this point with a couple of 
examples. 
First, two sentences may look different but actually express an extremely similar 
object, event, or aspect of the world. For example 'Simon gives Maiy a book' and 
'Maiy is given a book by Simon' describe the same event, although the former is in 
active voice while the latter is passive. Second, sentences in different languages may 
express roughly the same event. For example I t is raining outside' in English and ‘外面 
下著雨，in Chinese seem to have almost identical content. A way of characterising the 
sameness in content in these examples is to say that the common content expressed by 
the different sentences in each pair is a proposition. 
Prepositional theories are not without difficulties. First of all, the notion of a 
proposition is no less obscure than that of meaning. The identification of two obscure 
terms will not make either notion clearer and the only way out seems to be to clarify 
what a proposition is. But no matter what a proposition is, the following objection 
shows that a propositional theoiy is not a promising approach to theory of meaning. 
It is reasonable to claim that the understanding of meanings of sentences plays a 
causal role in people's decisions and actions. For instance, on hearing 'Some crocodiles 
are in front of our boat', all crew members will be on full alert, and some will be 
frightened, with faster heartbeat, sweating’ etc." 
On the one hand, if it is presumed that the physical world is causally closed, it is 
impossible to fit a proposition—a person-independent, abstract entity—into the causal 
For a more strict definition, sentences examined are limited to declarative sentences, in 
contrast to commands, questions and wishes. 
” There is a critical presupposition here that most people will react similarly to a similarcause. 
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explanation of human linguistic or non-lingiiistic behaviour, which is basically f^ysical. 
On the other hand, if a casually closed physical world is not presumed,'^ it is still 
not an easy task to argue how person-independent, abstract entities interact with human 
physical behaviour. In short, the latter case requires an explanation of how distinct kinds 
can interact with each other .�One strategy might be to argue that propositions and 
human behaviour are not distinct kinds. 
Putting other theoretical problems aside, in view of the interaction problem, 
propositional theories simply preempt this essay's central question—a study of how 
meaning is determined by people—which presumes that meaning is at least human-
dependent. If I employ a theory of meaning which claims that meaning is human-
independent, I must shelf the thesis for the time being and instead discuss first how such 
independence of meaning is still somehow related to people. 
Furthermore, it is a speaker who expresses a proposition by using a sentence to 
describe something in this world. A speaker's use of an expression is thus the link that 
connects a proposition with that particular expression, so the question of how use 
determines meaning remains relevant. 
4. According to truth-conditional theories，the meaning of a sentence is identified with its 
truth conditions, namely that the set of condition(s) under which the sentence is actually 
or would be t r ue . Truth-conditional theories often limit their analyses to declarative 
sentences, though natural languages contain sentences in a variety of moods: questions, 
commands, greetings, wishes, etc., which are meaningful but lack truth-conditions. One 
solution is to consider each utterance (that is, speech act) as composed of illocutionary 
Facing the continuous successes of physical sciences, which presume that physical causes 
are sufficient conditions for nearly all types of physical phenomenon (the causally closed world 
presumption), a presumption of a causally open world creates extra burden of proof on why 
such a presumption is preferred. 
13 An argument on this topic will both be long and divert the attention away from the thesis of 
this essay. 
For instance, Wittgenstein (1974: §4.024) says, 'To understand a proposition means is to 
know what is the case if it is true." For a more recent example, see Davidson's "Truth and 
Meaning" (1967). 
The clause "would be true" implies possible states ot affairs. That will be a discussion of 
theories of possible worlds and that will be beyond my present capability. So I just remark this 
point for the record. 
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and prepositional components, which are independent of each other. 
Another difficidly with truth-conditional theories is that truth-conditions in natural 
languages are often context sensitive. This is mainly because of the uses of various types 
of pronouns (I, her, that, e tc .) , and spatio-temporal indexicals (here，today, etc.), etc. 
As a result, the truth conditions of the sentence 'I criticised the president yesterday' vary 
with tiie utterer, the president criticised, and the time of utterance. The context of 
utterance (who speaks to whom, and when, etc.) becomes indispensable in 
understanding the meaning of the sentence. Such an additional requirement amounts to 
including a commnmcation-oriented factor in truth-conditional theories. 
A third difficulty concerns the notion of truth. Since the notion of meaning is 
understood as a function of truth, the difficulty is to explain how the notion of truth can 
be understood with respect to the notion of meaning so that the explanations of both 
notions will not be viciously circular. The mere presence of tiie truth conditions for a 
sentence (for example 'the cat is black') will not in itself explain what the sentence 
actually means. Thus it seems natural to suggest that in order to specify the truth 
condition of a sentence, one needs to grasp what it means first (for example, what 'the' 
means, 'cat' means, and 'is black' means).'' One way out is to claim that truth is basic 
and indefinable. But claiming that a term is indefinable usually makes it mysterious. One 
way to maintain that truth is indefinable but not mysterious, suggested by Davidson 
(1996), is to articulate Ihe relations between truth and some other definable terms such as 
This problem was identified by Davidson in 1967. Quite a few of his subsequent essays were 
attempted solution to the problem. See Davidson (1967: 36 and n20 on the same page.) 
Davidson calls the illocutionary forces moods, see Davidson's "Moods and Performances" 
(1979). 
161 have a fairly complicated example at hand. Ernest Gowers wrote a word usage guide The 
Complete Plain Words in 1954. Inside the text Gowers frequently used the first person 
pronoun T to suggest advice for improving word usages. This book was subsequently revised 
by Bruce Fraser in 1973 and then by Sidney Greenbaum and Janet Whitcut in 1986 while 
those subjective advice were retained. Thus it becomes difficult for the readers of the latest 
edition to find out to which writer the pronoun T refers. See Gowers (1986: vi-vli). 
17 Or as in Davidson's theory, the assignment of a truth condition cannot still be 
separated from how a sentence is used, therefore it is reasonable to start from use. 
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belief, cause, etc.'® This is a large project touching on quite a few sub-fields in 
philosophy. 
In view of these difficulties,'^ truth-conditional theories of meaning seem unlikely 
to be correct. 
This section has reviewed four major contemporary theories of meaning. They are not 
chosen as the background of this essay because they are too problem-laden (referential * 
theories and ideational theories), simply preempt the thesis (prepositional theories), or 
require extensive discussion of the theory itself before it may be applicable (truth-
conditional theories). Such shortcomings make these theories less promising than use 
theories, which will be explained in the next section.^' 
1.3.2 Meaning as Use 
Use theories contrast with the aforementioned theories of meaning in that use theories do 
not match the meaning of a sentence with some extralinguistic items or events, such as 
objects, ideas or abstract entities. A distinguishing feature of use theories is 
18 Davidson (1996: ff 309) argues that truth is indefinable, but at the same time, he attempts to 
characterise truth "by relating it to other concepts like belief, desire, cause, and action." 
Meaning is related to truth conditions in the way that the meaning of a sentence is causally 
determined by the truth conditions in the world that lead the speakers to use that sentence 
under certain type of situations. 
19 There is another major difficulty with truth-conditional theories. It involves the debate 
between realism and anti-realism. I don't think 丨 have grasped the ideas presented on both 
sides, so I just put this point here for the record. For an introduction to this topic, see Grayling 
(1997; ff 256). 
卯 A brief remark on truth-conditional theories. Even if meaning is truth conditions, the 
association between the two notions may be determined by the way speakers use the 
sentences to relate to those physical objects or events (that is, truth conditions) that cause the 
speakers to utter those sentences (that is, meaning bearers). Therefore, truth-conditional 
theories are somehow related to use. 
Besides these four, there are of course other competing theories of meaning. A fifth one 
bases the meaning ot an expression on speaker's intention, which was developed mainly by 
Grice (1957,1980). Simply put, according to this theory, what is meant by a piece of utterance 
depends fundamentally on that particular speaker's intention. However, the inclusion of the 
component of public criteria is necessary so as to render a speaker's intention, and thus the 
meaning of the utterance, understandable by others as well as the speaker. This point will be 
discussed in depth in section 2.2.1. Section 2.3 of the same chapter will argue that this factor 
of public criteria is in fact disposable during communication. With public criteria gone, it is hard 
to accept a theory of meaning that is based on speaker's intention alone. In other words I do 
not think that intention-based theory of meaning can be true. 
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demystifying such views by putting forward the alternative that linguistic meanings are 
determined by their uses in actual communicative circumstances in daily life. 
Modem works on use theories often quote from Wittgenstein's classic the 
Philosophical Investigations (1958).'' Wittgenstein (1958: §43) claims: 
For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word 
"meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the 
language. (Italics original.) 
Instances of language use are not isolated happenings; any instant of language use is 
connected to other instances. At the same time, language uses are also enmeshed with 
various kinds of daily human activities. Wittgenstein (1958: §7) calls "the whole, 
consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, the 'language-game'." 
The strength of this view is that it captures the multiplicity of language uses in real life: 
commanding, reporting, speculating, hypothesising，play-acting, guessing, joking, etc. 
(Ibid: §23尸 
Although adopting such an approach makes it hard to locate any common feature 
among such wide range of language uses, yet how people use language to do things 
(including to mean something) must form a discernible pattern of use. This discemibility 
of use regularities indicates that language uses must at least include the factor of rule-
govemedness. '^^  Indeed an aspect of this rule-govemedness—how many persons are 
involved in establishing a rule—will be carefully examined in the essay. 
The above sketch presents only some ideas about how a use-oriented approach can 
be adopted to solve the problem of meaning and is not yet a full-fledged theory. 
However’ the word 'theoiy' (or theories) is retained because such a set of views 
contrasts with the doctrines of other theories. Also, use theories indeed include some 
Wittgenstein himself might be horrified to find that his insights, which are quite unsystematic, 
are regarded as a kind of theory. Wittgenstein's views are supposed to correct certain pitfalls of 
other theories, especially the referential and ideational theories. And it is generally agreed that 
Wittgenstein's chief effort in his later works is to dissolve philosophical pitfalls rather than to 
advance theses. 
The view is echoed by a contemporary Habermas commentator Maeve Cooke, who writes, 
"Use-oriented theories of meaning have been responsible for drawing attention to the entire 
spectrum of linguistic activity." (Cooke, 1997:98) 
1 will argue for this point next chapter (section 2.2.1). 
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general theories such as speech act theoiy. 
Use theories developed along these lines have been criticised for mistakenly 
identifying meaning and use,when people may know how to use an expression without 
understanding its meaning. For example, people may correctly use the expressions like 
'amen', 'perse\QXc., but they may not know their meanings. Or a student may use some 
jargon in a subject quite fluently after rote learning without understanding any of it. 
Also, it is the notion of a meaning, which needs explanation in the first place, but 
now, in use theories, the burden of explanation is only shifted to the notion of use, 
which is found to be vague (lacking any common feature except maybe rule-
govemedness). 
A possible reply is that the meaning of an expression can be sufficiently 
characterised by explaining its use. The defenders will also gladly accept the criticism of 
the vagueness of the notion of use, as they are not establishing a general theoiy. On the 
contrary, any piecemeal analysis of a specific use of a word or expression can be 
regarded as deepening the understanding of its meaning. 
I find these replies satisfactory in forestalling major difficulties at least for the 
moment. Use theories seem to face fewer and less intractable difficulties than other 
theories of meaning. Hence, a rough use theoiy will be adopted as the basis of the 
essay. The link between meaning, linguistic expression and use is thus as follows: a 
speaker uses a linguistic expression to rnean something. 
The term 'use theories', as used here，refers not to one unified theoiy but is an 
umbrella term including several theories focusing on the use(s) of language. Speech act 
theory,^ f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s 尸 and inferentialism^ are examples of use theories. These 
specific use theories will be discussed in the essay only to the extent that they are 
251 am not saying that these are the only difficulties for use theories. As the essay develops, the 
reader may find that there are more specific problems and I will provide solutions in 
corresponding arguments. For instance, linguistic meanings cannot be an assortment of 
largely unrelated words and sentences. I will discuss this issue in section 3.4.1 "Meanings and 
Inferential Roles". 
Developed by J. L. Austin and then John Searle. See especially Austin (1975) and Seatle 
(1969). 
Developed by Jiirgen Habermas. See especially Habermas (1984: section III) and (1998). 
Developed by Wilfrid Sellars and then Robert Brandom. See especially Sellars (1997) and 
Brandom (1994) and (2000). 
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relevant to the sociality thesis. 
1.3.3 What 'Social' Can Mean 
This essay is entitled The Social Nature of Meaning. ’ But even confined to the field of 
philosophy of language and problem of meaning, the word 'social' can mean quite a lot 
of things. I am going to delimit the area of study and identity the kinds of social nature 
that will not be discussed here. 
For language or meaning, the commonest sense of being social is that language 
(and meaning) must be learnt through social interaction (or cultural transmission). A 
baby cannot learn a natural language unless it has sustained contact with adults, I call 
this the argument from acquisition'-the social nature of meaning lies in the fact that 
acquisition is not a solitary process. The counter-argument is that this claim is basically 
an empirical one, it leaves open the logical possibility (no matter how remote) that 
someone could develop a language all on his own without interacting with other human 
beings. I will largely skip the issues in this area. 
Another sense of ‘social’ can be understood along the Gricean line that a linguistic 
expression has meaning because it is an utterance that expresses the speaker's intention 
to some target audience in a particular social setting.^ Since a speaker's intention may 
be quite different from the common meaning of a sentence, Grice distinguishes 
between speaker-meaning (or utterer's meaning) and 'timeless meaning.' This essay will 
not discuss the relation between speaker-meaning, intentions and social setting. The 
'timeless meaning' is called in this essay the literal or linguistic meaning of a linguistic 
expression, or simply the meaning. 
The social nature of meaning can also be understood in terms of the perlocutionary 
effect upon the hearer when a speaker says something 严 The success of the effect 
depends on certain social context as well as the hearer's psychology. Such an effect 
Saussure (1983: ch II, §1); Sapir (1921: 4); Yule (1996:24). 
3° See especially Grice (1989: essays 5, 6 and 14) 
31 An example is like this: Even when a Cantonese speaker mispronounces quite frequently 
when she is speaking Mandarin, and thus conveying some bizarre linguistic meaning by her 
utterances, in most cases a Mandarin-speaking hearer can nonetheless figure out what the 
speaker intends. 
32 See Austin (1975). 
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involves the speaker's intention and is beyond the literal meaning of the utterance. 
Meaning as a function of perlocutionary effects will also not be treated in this essay. 
Distinct from these various senses of sociality, the social nature of meaning to be 
discussed here concerns how many people determine the literal meanings of linguistic 
expressions uttered (or written) in everyday circumstances. Since this essay presumes 
that the meaning of a linguistic expression is understood with respect to its everyday 
use(s), the determination of meaning refers to the determination of how a linguistic 
expression is appropriately used in an ordinary situation. The central question of this 
essay is thus: Does the determination of meaning require the involvement of at least two 
parties, or can a single language-user determine the meaning of her own expressions?^^ 
1.4 Layout of the Essay 
This introduction will be followed by three chapters. The second and third chapters 
discuss various specific senses of the sociality thesis. Chapter two, "The Social Nature 
of Meaning (Part One): Prior Agreement & Uniform Response," considers the views a) 
that meaning is determined by prior agreement through deliberate decision among the 
speakers, and b) that meaning is fixed by reference to uniform response exhibited in a 
community. Chapter three, "The Social Nature of Meaning (Part Two): Background & 
Commimication," discusses the views c) that to fix a meaning depends on sharing a 
background of implicit knowledge, and also d) that meaning can be determined by 
distinct perspectives during communication. 
Chapter four concludes the essay by summarising the thesis, the main arguments 
for different views, and the conclusions of the discussion. Finally, I will propose a 
suggestion on how to follow up the research. 
33 Inevitably, some wordings in the question requi res further qualifications, for instance, the 
word "involve" looks quite straightforward but turns out to be a decisive component of the 
thesis, I will leave such explanatory works to the main part of the essay. 
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^he SOCIAL Nature O^ /Keanin^ { ^ A T T One): 
^ t i d y^^'teement Tyini-^otm Tiesponse 
2.1 Overview 
1. This chapter examines two specific senses of the sociality thesis: a contractarian view 
(that meaning is determined by prior agreement) and a uniform response view (that 
meaning is determined by uniform response). I will first present the contractarian view, 
and then demonstrate that it is so problematic that in general it cannot be true. The 
uniform response view is presented in this chapter but not criticised until the next one. 
As I mentioned in the last chapter, the various specific versions of the sociality 
thesis are presented and examined in such an order that the objections against one view 
link to a different specific sense of the sociality thesis, which is then discussed and 
revised or refuted in tiim. Thus, as I present them, the relation between the contractarian 
view and the uniform response view is that the latter view attacks a necessary 
presupposition of the former view. At the same time the uniform response view has its 
own account of how meaning is determined by speakers. 
2. To begin，I explore the apparently commonsensical account that meaning is based on 
general agreement (or acknowledgement) in advance among language users. Such 
agreement (or acknowledgement) is the result of deliberate decision processes. I call this 
account the contractarian view, the first specific sense of the sociality thesis. 
I claim that the contractarian view is commonsensical as it is a platitude to think that 
at least some meanings originate from mutual agreement on what linguistic expressions 
mean. It sounds platitudinous because when someone asks why a particular expression 
means such-and-such, a fairly common reply is that most people means such-and-such 
by it. And a straightforward explanation is that these people have agreed in advance, 
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either explicitly or tacitly, on the meaning.' 
As we will see, this platitude or commonsensical claim is not as problem-free as it 
seems. But before criticising it in section 2.3，section 2.2 will present the case for the 
contractarian view, clarifying how meaning can be determined by prior agreement 
According to this first sense of the social nature of meaning, the determination of a 
meaning depends on the presence of a kind of agreement in a community. Thus it is a 
kind of commimity view.^ 
Section 2.3 discusses a couple of objections against the contractarian view. The 
first one is that the contractarian view depicts actual communication poorly. The second 
one is that this view presupposes, as a necessary condition for complying with agreed 
on conventions, the possibility of intentionally following rules? Kripke (1982) has 
argued that there is no such thing as rule-following, and thus there can be also no such 
thing as rule-dependent meaning. 
Section 2.4 reviews Kripke’s sceptical solution，which restores meaning to 
1 David Lewis once remarked, "It is a platitude ... that there are conventions of language" 
(Martinich, 1990:491). As with other platitudes or general claims, Lewis's is disputed by 
another notable philosopher Donald Davidson, who accused that Lewis and other 
philosophers "who make convention a necessary element in language have the matter 
backwards." (Davidson, 1982a: 280) Davidson's views on the topic will be mentioned or 
discussed in later sections. 
The employment of language to mean something to others (that is, to communicate) is one of 
the two constitutive functions of language, as Dummett (1989:166) says, "Language, it is 
natural to say, has two principal functions: that of an instrument of communication, and that of a 
vehicle of thought." Allan (1986，vol. 2: 281) concludes by the end of his two volume study, 
"Language is essentially a vehicle through which speaker S communicates with hearer H." 
Thus 丨 suggest that it is commonsensical to claim that meaning is based on convention, too. 
2 The uniform response view is also a community view. Thus they are grouped in this chapter. 
I'm not sure when the term "community view" was first used. I first came across it in "The 
Community View" (1996), a paper by John Canfield. The purpose of Canfield's paper is to 
clarity the exegetical controversy over Wittgenstein's private language argument and offers a 
balanced reading to Wittgenstein's text. Although the issue handled in this essay is quite 
different from Canfield's, I find the term very suitable and useful to characterise the view 
supporting a social convention. Furthermore, the term "community" has a special sense in 
social sciences, my use here is merely to emphasise that there is a group of people sharing the 
same set of linguistic conventions or linguistically-related behaviour. 
3 By rule-following, I take it that it presupposes a regularity in behaviour and the agent takes the 
rule as (at least part of) her reason for behaviour in that regular way. (Glock, 1996:324) While 
the controversy is best represented by works of two ot the antagonists: Saul Kripke (1982) 
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, a representation of rule-scepticism; Gordon 
Baker and P. M. S. Hacker (1984) "On Misunderstanding Wittgenstein: Kripke's Private 
Langu^e Argument". Also by Baker and Hacker,Scepticism, Rules and Language. Both are 
attacks on the rule-sceptical view. 
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language uses. Kripke argues that meanings are determined by the standard of uniform 
responses exhibited by comniimity members. This view constitutes the second specific 
sense of the sociality thesis I will discuss. I call it the uniform response view. As the 
determination of meaning in this case also involves a kind of agreement in a community, 
it is a coimnimity view, too. 
Section 2.5 briefly sums up my conclusion about these two specific views—prior 
agreement and uniform response. Criticism of the uniform response view will be 
deferred until the next chapter. 
2.2 The Contractarian View 
This section presents the contractarian view that meaning is determined by a kind of 
prior agreement on criteria that define how linguistic expressions are correctly applied in 
everyday circumstances. Such correct applications are maintained by mutual 
confirmation among speakers who already know the meanings in advance. 
A contractarian view holder will tty to demonstrate first that the meaning of a 
linguistic expression is intelligible only if the uses of the expression are governed by 
public criteria. These public criteria are what a group of people would agree on (or 
acknowledge) in advance. By checking each others' uses, they also make sure that the 
uses of linguistic expressions are correct. 
Throughout this section, it is presupposed that language users have the capability to 
follow rules. In other words speakers can grasp and act in accordance with the criteria 
(or standards) according to which the uses of linguistic expression are judged to be 
correct. Since this essay also takes it that meaning is determined by rule-governed use, 
this capability is a prerequisite for the determination of meaning. This prerequisite of 
rule-following is emphasised because it is a key point on which the contractarian view 
and the uniform response view, two specific senses of tlie sociality thesis, are opposed. 
As the uniform response view denies that this sort of rule-governed use can explain 
meaning. 
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2.2.1 Public Criteria 
1. A contractarian view holder may employ a form of private language argumenf to 
argue for the necessity of public criteria in meaning determination. A private language is 
a language no one, except the user herself, can understand, and all meanings in this 
language are determined solely by the user. The crux of the argument is that a language 
unintelligible to others will also be unintelligible to the user, because she will not be able 
to distinguish between correct and incorrect uses. Therefore, there can be no such thing 
as a private language. On the contrary, linguistic meanings can be understandable, by the 
user or others, only if the uses of linguistic expressions are governed by public criteria. 
Here 'public' means that the criteria can be understood not by the speaker alone, but also 
by others. ‘ 
2. Let us consider the simplest case of a private language user attempting to mean 
something, by correlating a sign with a sensation. For instance, she calls a certain 
sensation by the name and then upon subsequent occasions she calls similar 
sensations 'S'. The central question is: how does she make sure that she actually 
identifies that particular sensation, but not other seemingly similar but in fact different 
ones, as 'S' on subsequent occasions?^ 
To identify a sensation is to identify it as a particular kind of sensation, that is, to 
identify its distinguishing features.® But any sensation can be classified (or 
distinguished) in numerous ways, as the classification is up to the language user(s). For 
example, it could be classified according to its duration, its intensity, the time of the day 
the sensation is experienced, the body part where it is felt, consequent behaviour, or any 
combination of the above factors. 
Hence, some criteria are required to guide the applications of ‘S’ on subsequent 
^ Please be noted that I dare not claim it is "f/7© private language argument", which commonly 
refers to the famous argument originated from Wittgenstein (1958). Any discussion of "the 
private language argument" inevitably involves the question whether it is the actual, historical 
Wittgenstein. It is definitely not my purpose to do so here. 
5 Whether a distinction in this sense can be drawn is crucial to any conception of meaning. This 
problem can be known as the "seems right/is right" distinction. 
6 It is of the relation between type and token. A particular dog is a token of the type dog. A 
particular patch of blueness is a token of the type blueness. Etc. 
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occasions; otherwise, the application of tibe name ‘S’ becomes totally arbitrary and ‘S， 
has no fixed meaning. (Just imagine that on the first occasion refers to duration, on 
the second to intensity, on the third to body part, etc.) If the applications are arbitrary, it 
becomes senseless to say that 'S' means anything at all, as 'S' could mean anything and 
we simply would not know (or guess) what 'S' would be used to refer to on the next 
occasion. 7 
For the private language user, there are two options for establishing such criteria. 
One is to set up the criteria in linguistic expressions others understand. However, this 
option is ruled out, because it will make her private language non-private. The remaining 
option is to set up criteria in her private language, which others do not understand. 
Therefore others also cannot understand the criteria. Hence whenever she calls out 
others can only trust her judgement. They cannot determine for themselves whether the 
utterance is correct. 
Putting the problem of her trustworthiness aside, since the criteria are part of her 
private language, which others do not understand, a similar problem of correct usage 
arises with respect to the criteria: how does she know that those criteria she employs to 
guide herself are actually the correct criteria she fixed in the past? May she be mistaken, 
and apply a different set of criteria? In this case, further criteria will not help as it only 
pushes the problem another step backwards, falling into an infinite regress.® 
It turns out that there is no guarantee at all that the private language user can identify 
a particular sensation successfully and then apply the term ‘S’ appropriately. The private 
language user may actually identify subsequent instances of the sensation correctly, but 
there is also the possibility that she has mistaken the identification and her judgement 
merely seems to be correct to her. When the private language user attempts to use ‘S，to 
mean something, the connection between 'S' and the sensation could not be established 
7 It could be caricatured as Humpty Dumpty's theory of meaning: "'when I use a word", Humpty 
Dumpty said, “ it means just what I choose to mean.'" 
® It may be responded that the argument runs in this way ignores the authority of self-
knowledge, for example, the validity of self-ascriptions. It can be replied that the acquisition of 
self-ascription terms like Tm in pain" involves the presence of public criteria, too. Otherwise, 
such terms would never be leamt or made intelligible. Quite a few secondary material on private 
language argument have covered this part, for example, "Wittgenstein's Treatment of Private 
Language" in Stem (1995). 
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in such a way that a discernible pattern of use regularity would be created, as a result 
there will be no successful instance of language use. In other words, the private 
language user cannot mean anything successfully at all. Nor can others help, as they do 
not understand what she is saying (due to the definitional constraint that others do not 
understand her private language). 
As a result, a private language user cannot identify a new sensation as a certain 
type. Nor can she claim that she can successfully apply a linguistic term to a certain type 
of sensation on subsequent occasions. The private language user's attempt to correlate 
the linguistic term 'S' with a certain kind of sensation simply fails. 
This result amounts to saying that a private language is unintelligible in the sense 
that since such a language does not enable its user, the only person who understands the 
language, to distinguish between correct and incorrect use, the user is unable to use the 
language to mean anything successfully.^ It is similar to chess-playing (or any other 
game-playing), if a player could not distinguish which moves were legal, she would be 
unable to play at all. 
Therefore a prerequisite for anyone to understand a linguistic expression is that the 
use of this expression must be governed by public criteria, while 'public' means that the 
criteria are understandable, not by the speaker alone, but also by others. 
2.2.2 Intersubjective checking 
Public criteria governing language use are a prerequisite for meaning. Since a critical 
point of this necessary condition is to allow a speaker's uses of linguistic expressions to 
be checked for correctness, a sensible question is who checks whom. Remember that 
'public' means that the criteria can be understood, not by the speaker alone, but also by 
9 Jerry Fodor (1990) expresses a similar view: the meaning of a linguistic expression entitles 
that "some ways of using symbols are wrong" (p. 128. Italics original.) The unavailability of the 
latter means the absence of the former. (Please note that Fodor's argument is valid simply 
because it is in the form of modus toliens.) 
Paul Boghossian (1989) also says, "The fact that the expression means something implies, 
that is, a whole set of normative truths about my behaviour with that expression: namely, that 
my use of it is correct in application to certain objects and not in application to others 
meaningful expressions possess conditions of correct use." (p. 513. Italics original.) 
Such normative aspect of meaning is called the nomnativlty of language. K is indeed a central 
issue in the problem of meaning and in philosophy of language. But this essay may not be able 
to discuss more and deeper in this direction. 
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others. This makes sense only if the checking can in principle be carried out by others, 
not monopolised by the speaker. 
Intersubjective checking is always potentially available, but only sometimes actually 
carried out, especially towards novice language users. However, in the linguistic 
community in general, there is no centralised linguistic policing to check every bit of 
language use (as in a linguistic Big Brother scenario). Instead one might suppose that all 
the members of the community have the right and c冲ability to spot any incorrect usage 
at will. Such checking is usually carried out during commimication (face-to-face or 
through reading). 
If any member (or organisation) is judged by others to mean something incorrectly 
on frequent occasions, this member will either lose trustworthiness' ‘ or be punished by 
the brute consequence that she encounters difficulties in communicating smoothly with 
others. In the long run, this member will simply be excommunicated. Such an 
interweaving of meaningful expression and intersubjective checking forms the basis for 
establishing a linguistic community. 
Intersubjective checking implements a kind of corrective measure in linguistic 
practices. If an individual believes that she is following a rule correctly and 
demonstrating a regular pattern in her own eyes, that is not enough; from others' 
perspectives, if they cannot discover criteria to describe and predict this individual's 
supposed regularity, as well as to correct what this individual has said and done in case 
of deviations, this individual's speech and behaviour will still be unintelligible. 
The intersubjective checking requirement is thus not only applicable to fellow 
members within the same community, but also applicable to any isolated member 
without the community. Though in such a case no community members are actually 
included in intersubjective checking, they could potentially be included. 
As a successful communication implies that the participants understand the meanings of 
each other. Any language misuse will lead to misunderstanding or even non-understanding. 
” David Lewis (1975: 491) suggests that a presumption of trustworthiness and trust are 
necessary for establishing convention. 
Kripke (1982) makes a harsher judgement: "I will judge him probably to have gone insane." 
(p. 90) He is arguing in a different direction though. Please read section 2.4. 
13 It is due to the consequence of the private language argument discussed in section 2.2.1, as 
this individual will be trapped in her private language and is unable to draw the distinction 
between what seems right and what is right. 
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Given that potential intersubjective checking is necessary, there remains another 
problem: "Where do the public criteria for correct use come from?" One obvious 
possibility is that they are established by explicit prior agreement. I call this the 
contractarian view. The remainder of this section will discuss this notion of prior 
agreement, which grounds a version of the community view. 
2.2.3 Prior Agreement 
For meaning to be possible, that is to mean something intelligibly to anyone, public 
criteria are required. Criteria are public in the sense that they can be known to others, so 
that others know the standards against which the language user's utterances are to be 
checked. In addition, the checking needs potentially to be carried out by others, usually 
during communication or reading, so tiiat public criteria are not rendered ineffective. 
How do a group of language users come to agree on public criteria for the correct 
uses of linguistic expressions? One plausible explanation is that they share some 
common standards of language use in advance. By mutually recognising the convention 
that 'cat' means cat, 'mat' means mat, means such-and-such, etc., these people are 
capable of checking if others are correct in applying these words. They know the 
standard set by the rules for the use of a particular linguistic expression.'^ 
The contractarian view is considered a plausible explanation because of two 
reasons. First, it is a straightforward model accommodating both the factors of public 
criteria and potential checking. Second, by an analogy with other human games, like 
chess-playing or Scrabble, in which all competent participants normally know most of 
the game-governing rules in advance’ it suggests how speakers know the rules of 
language-games. 
“Just a reminder, a community view in this essay refers to the view that the determination of 
meaning depends on the presence of a community. See also footnote *2 in section 2,1. 
151 presume in this section that there is only one type of rule-following, namely to follow public 
criteria in determining the correction application of a particular linguistic expression. However, 
John Haugeland (1998: 320-5) has distinguished four interrelated types of rule-following: 
constitutive regulations, constitutive standards, constitute skills and mundane skills. He also 
compare the mastery of a natural language to the skills acquired by "chicken-sexers". Once 
speakers have mastered the skill, it becomes effortless for them to take part in communication 
but they cannot know how they can do that. (Ibid: 327-8, 358 n19) 
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If the above view is feasible, it amounts to a kind of prior agreement on the content 
(or function) of linguistic expressions. Public criteria governing language use, prior 
agreement upon such criteria, and possible intersubjective checking to ensure correct 
uses are thus the three elements that constitute the contractarian version of the sociality 
thesis. 16 The following section will evaluate to what extent the contractarian view is 
acceptable. 
2.3 Criticism of the Contractarian View 
1. This section is a transition, before a new specific sense of the thesis will be discussed 
in the following section. 
I will consider a couple of criticisms of the contractarian view, namely that prior 
agreement does not portray actual communication accurately, and also that prior 
agreement presupposes the possibility of rule-following, which is questionable 
according to some philosophers. This second objection leads to another specific sense of 
the sociality thesis, the uniform response view. However, this section will be concerned 
only with criticism of the contractarian view. A positive statement of the uniform 
response view will be given in the next section. 
2. First of all, the contractarian view (or the first specific sense of the sociality thesis) is 
We conclude that meaning of a linguistic term is possible only if there are public criteria 
(according to which usage of a particular term is correct). We require public criteria before we 
can mean something Intelligibly. If we suppose that public criteria can be reached by prior 
agreement, we will face the following problem: we cannot even reach the first agreement as 
that we agree to some criteria of meaning something already presupposes that we are able to 
mean something—the dreadful vicious circle, (see Quine, 1969; xi) 
David Lewis (1969: esp. ch. 1,2) has shown that there need not be regress as there is no 
deliberation. Regularity in behaviour arise out of common interest among rational agents 
automatically. As conformity to convention benefits all the players. A notable example for 
convention is language use in which the common interest is conforming to the regularities or 
conventions which facilitate effective communication. 
The common attack upon Lewis's ideas is that his scheme depends too much on rational 
decision. Tyler Burge (1975) noted that besides rational decision, conventions are often 
influenced by "inertia, superstition and ignorance" and also by "enlightened self-interest", (pp. 
253-5) While Margaret Gilbert (1989) thought that Lewis's account of convention does not 
match linguistic convention satisfactorily as Lewis's account would lead to a "metastable self-
perpetuating system" (Lewis 1969:42), individuals function like a cog in the system but 
language users are equally affected by personal desires and other intentions. (Gilbert, 1989: 
387-9) 
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wrong in some philosophers' eyes simply because it does not portray actual 
communication accurately. We come across unfamiliar language uses (that is, completely 
or partially new meanings) in every instant of communication. But we do not attempt to 
understand a novel meaning by checking it with some prior agreement by somebody. 
Some of the time we make preliminary educated guesses about the meaning and then 
revise these as commimication proceeds. Other times we just follow the ways how other 
people whom we trust use new words or sentences. 
This is why Davidson (1982: 277) says, "Commimication does not demand ... that 
speaker and hearer mean the same thing by the same words …” Regularity in linguistic 
behaviour is not a cause, but only a result. He explains that "people tend to speak much 
as their neighbours do" simply because of socialisation. (Ibid: 278) Davidson concludes 
that "convention is not a condition of language. ... [P]hilosophers who make convention 
a necessary element in language have the matter backwards." (Ibid: 280) That meaning is 
based on prior agreement is not a straightforward platitude, as suggested at the 
beginning of this essay.口 
3. Another critical challenge to the prior agreement model stems from questions about 
the tenability of rule-following. According to the model, speakers agree in advance on 
the meanings of expressions, whose uses are governed by public criteria. Then speakers 
will follow such criteria to use the expressions in communication to mean something. 
The model presumes that people are capable of following rules. In other words, it 
presumes that there is such a thing as rule-following, since without the practice of 
following rules, there will be no such thing as correct applications of linguistic 
expressions. Being unable to identify which applications are correct and which not, 
speakers cannot claim that they are employing words to mean anything intelligibly. To 
17 Just as a reminder, the prior agreement is presented as the ti rst view of the sociality thesis 
because some philosophers like Lewis claims that it is a platitude that there are conventions of 
language. (Lewis, 1975:491) However, upon close examination, some philosophers like 
Davidson say that this view does not portray actual communication accurately, he then 
proposes his radical interpretation scheme (1982), while some defenders of a convention-
based language like Dummett (1989) claims that what Davidson points out are just exceptional 
cases. I would be satisfied to show that the platitude is indeed not a platitude and then leave 
the matter here. As any thorough treatment of the debates between Davidson and Dummett is 
both beyond the agenda of the essay as well as my present capability. 
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repeat the chess-playing example, if a player could not distinguish which moves were 
legal, she would be unable to play chess at all. 
Hence, since rule-following is a necessary presupposition of the prior agreement 
model, establishing that there is no such thing as rule-following is like pulling the plug 
on the feasibility of this model. 
The challenge has two consequences. On the one hand, if successful, it poses 
another major problem for the contractarian view. On the other hand, more significant in 
the context of this essay, it leads to a second specific sense of the sociality thesis—the 
view that meaning is determined by imiform responses. 
2.4 The Uniform Response View 
1. Section 2.2 presents the agreement-based community view, which presumes that 
speakers are capable of following certain public criteria in determining the cotrect uses of 
linguistic expressions. In other words this model presupposes that there is such a thing 
as rule-following. As I pointed out in the previous section, this presupposition is not 
shared by all. Kripke (1982) is a leading philosopher who has argued that there is no 
such thing as rule-following, on the typical view that the content of a rule is determined 
by a certain sort of meaning-constituting fac t , Kripke argues that the meanings of a 
speaker's utterances are determined by the imiform responses exhibited by members 
throughout the commimity. If a speaker conforms sufficiently to such a pattern of 
imiform responses, she will qualify as a member of that linguistic community. Meanings 
are instmments posited to explain behaviour. In fact, there are no such thing as 
meanings, which are determined by rules. 
Kripke's criticism points to a different way of understanding the social nature of 
meaning, which I will explore below. 
2. To begin, Kripke's argument against rule-following can be summarised roughly as 
18 A summary of Kripke's argument against rule-following is presented in section 2.4 on this 
page. 
19 Taking this sense Into consideration,丨 claim that Kripke says that there is no such thing as 
rule-following. Of course, Kripke's own view would be that he is explaining what rule-following 
actually is. 
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follows 严 There is no fact, empirical or mental 尸 in virtue of which one can be justified 
in determining that one is following one rule rather than another. As a result, no deviant 
interpretation of a rule can be categorically excluded. For any finite number of cases, 
there are an infinite number of rules compatible with the cases. This desperate situation 
is aggravated because 
[A]ny set of instructions that come before the mind require interpretation as much 
as the linguistic expression whose understanding they are supposed to facilitate, 
and are thus as susceptible to deviant interpretation as that original expression. 
Clearly, invoking instructions for interpreting the instructions will send us off on 
a fruitless infinite regress. (Miller and Wright, 2002: 5-6尸 
Accepting this sceptical argument that there is no such thing as rule-following, 
Kripke does not allow any explanation of meaning that depends in any sense on it What 
he does is to offer a sceptical solution，that is, one that accepts the conclusions of the 
sceptical argument’ A linguistic community consisting of members exhibiting imifomi 
responses to certain linguistic expressions is adopted as a standard, against which a 
speaker's behaviour is compared. If tiie speaker conforms sufficiently to the standard of 
uniform responses, she will be admitted to the community. Saying that a speaker gains 
community membership amounts to saying that she is considered as meaning the same 
as what other members mean. 
Under such a scheme, meanings are not identified as real entities, or reducible to, 
or determined by, meaning-constituting facts (all of these are disallowed by the sceptic 
Kripke writes that in the book (1982: 5), he is "trying to present Wittgenstein's argument," 
but not "views of his own." However, he writes on the same page that what he writes is "rather 
Wittgenstein's argument as it struck Kripke,as it presented a problem tor him." I consider the 
views presented In the book basically Kripke's in the guise of an interpretation of 
Wittgenstein's argument. 
Empirical facts refer to one's or others' previous behaviour while mental facts refer to one's 
previous mental histories. 
Such a reading that Wittgenstein's notion of rule-following presupposes interpretation is 
highly controversial. For instance McDowell (1984) argues that this presupposition is wrong. I 
will discuss more about this point in section 3.2 in the following chapter. 
Furthemnore I would like to reiterate that I am not going to examine if Kripke's account is an 
appropriate exegesis of Wittgenstein's ideas. What 丨 am doing here is to employ Kripke's 
argument to argue tor my case about the relation between meaning and social convention. 
23 A sceptical solution contrasts with a straight solution, e.g. Goldfarb (1985), which reveals the 
flaws in the argument for the sceptical paradox. 
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paradox). Instead, meanings are posited as instruments to explain why the linguistic 
members behave so-and-so in a harmonious way. 
The presence of a commxmity is necessary, as the responses (overt behaviour) 
demonstrated uniformly among the members constitute the only standard employed to 
check whether a speaker means something correctly. An isolated person lacks such a 
standard and thus cannot mean anything. The solution is to “consider him as interacting 
with a wider commimity." (Kripke, 1982: 89) That is, to check his behaviour as if he 
were a member of the community. 
In this way, meanings are ascribed back to speakers' utterances by spelling out the 
circumstances under which the meanings actually play roles in the community members' 
social life. 
To put the meaning ascription strategy another way, Kripke holds that we cannot 
accept this conditional statement: "If a person means such-and-such, she must do so-
and-so under a given occasion," because we can never be sure of the antecedent (a 
person means such-and-such). But a commimity accepts the contfaposed form of the 
conditional.狄 
The failure of an individual to come up with the particular responses the 
community regards as right leads the commimity to suppose that he is not 
following ttie rule. On the other hand, if an individual passes enough tests, the 
community (endorsing assertions of the form [he means such-and-such]) accepts 
him as a rule follower, thus enabling him to engage in certain types of 
interactions with them that depend on their reliance on his responses. (Ibid: 108-
9 f 
The advantage of the contraposed form of argument is that such ascriptions allow 
us to discriminate who the reliable language users in the community are. 'Reliable' here 
refers to the agent being in step with the overt behaviour of the rest of the community, a 
speaker who exhibits sufficient conformity in meaning something is included in that 
particular commimity. Such a regular pattern of behaviour is called 2iform of life. This 
24 For a conditional sentence "p~<’, the contraposed form is 
The first part is a modus tollens with respect to the conditional, the second looks like an 
argument from analogy. 
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account allows the possibility that there are other forms of life which use linguistic 
expressions similar to ours, but demonstrate “bizarre and incomprehensible" patterns of 
behaviour. (Ibid: 96) 
On this view, meaning is determined by membership in a conimimity, so obviously 
this view entails a form of the sociality thesis. I call this specific sense of the sociality 
thesis the uniform response view. It is the second social nature of meaning discussed in 
this essay. Chapter three will criticise this view and link it to other specific senses of the 
thesis. 
2.5 Summing-up 
This chapter presents two different specific senses of the sociality thesis, namely the 
contractarian view and the imiforai response view. They are linked together in such a 
way that the latter view emerges from critical examination of the former one. 
1. The contractarian view holds that meaning is determined by two or more parties who 
have agreed in advance on what the meanings are. 
First, linguistic meaning is possible only when language uses are governed by 
public criteria, because without public criteria for checking if the uses are right, tbere 
will not be any distinction between correct and incorrect uses. And without such a 
distinction, there will not be any intelligible language use. 
Second, since on the one hand, the criteria governing language uses are public, and 
on the other hand, more than one speaker are capable of employing the criteria to check 
each other so as to make sure everyone conforms to these criteria-governed uses, the 
contractarian view offers a straightforward explanation that these criteria are in fact 
agreed by all the speakers in advance. 
The contractarian view is the first specific sense of the sociality thesis discussed in 
the essay. This view does not fare too well because a) it does not accurately depict real 
communication, in which prior agreement on meanings is seldom obtained from all the 
participants, and b) the presupposition that there is such a thing as rule-following has 
been challenged. 
28 
2. The unifonn response view questions the necessary presupposition of the 
contractarian view that there is such a thing as rule-following. Kripke argues that there is 
no such thing. If he is right，then the contractarian view is untenable. 
Linguistic meanings can, however, be ascribed back to speakers' utterances by 
being posited as instruments to explain their behaviour. If a speaker's responses 
conform sufficiently to the imifomi responses exhibited by community members on the 
whole，she will be qualified as a community member and she uses words with the same 
meaning as other members do. Community members' uniform responses are just brute 
facts and cannot be further explained. 
In the imiforai response view, the focus is on whether a speaker can engage in 
reliable interaction with other community members, but not on whether this speaker is 
actually meaning such-and-such when making a particular utterance. Meanings are 
posited by community members as instruments to explain speakers' behaviour, and thus 
enable the members to find out which speaker is reliaWe. 
3. Since meaning determination in both specific senses of the sociality thesis depends on 
the presence of a community, both are a kind of community view. The contractarian 
view is so problem-laden that I consider it untenable. The urdform response view has 
been presented here but will be evaluated only in the next chapter. 
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3 
^he SocLut N^tu^e o右 /Kenning ^wo): 
^Ackftound Si (^otnmunicAtion 
3.1 Overview 
1.1 closed last chapter by presenting the Kripkeaii sense of the sociality thesis: since 
there is no such thing as rule-following (the sceptical paradox),' meanings are ascribed 
to a speaker's utterances only so long as her behaviour conforms to the uniform 
responses of her commimity (the sceptical solution). This chapter will put forward two 
criticisms of this uniform response view, namely that first, the sceptical solution of 
basing meaning only on community standards is untenable, second, the validity of the 
sceptical paradox is questionable. 
The first criticism is solely destructive, but the second one will bring out a new 
specific sense of the sociality thesis, namely tliat background information plays a 
necessary role in fixing meaning. Rrst of all, the existence of other people and the 
speaker's social relation to others normally make up the background; furthermore, such 
a background is public and is potentially shared by more than one person; and last, 
communication is possible only if the participants share a certain amount of the 
background. These three factors constitute the third sense in which meaning can be said 
to be social in nature. 
After presenting this "background information view", which distinguishes what 
type of uses makes sense to community members who possesses a particular 
background, I will put forward the view (Brandom 1994，2000) that meanings can be 
fixed precisely by locating their inferential roles in reasoning, perception, and action (or 
broadly inferential articulation). Brandom (Ibid) proposes that meaning is determined by 
a kind of scorekeeping process that comprises distinct perspectives during 
communication. This view constitutes the fourth specific sense of the sociality thesis. 
1 Just a reminder, Kripke's sceptical paradox is the argument that since there is no meaning-
constituting fact, therefore there is no such thing as following a rule which is fixed by any such 
fact, so there is also no such thing as rule-governed uses; hence, there is no such thing as 
meaning. 
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The pros and cons of these two specific senses of the sociality thesis will be 
discussed in this chapter. I will then present my conclusion in the following one. 
2. Section 3.2 criticises the sceptical solution in the imifomi response view by asking the 
following questions: If a person is checked against the community standard, who is 
checking the community? If coimnumty members as a whole can be taken for granted as 
fixing meanings correctly with no help from outside, why is an individual not regarded 
as self-sufficient in fixing meanings? This part is chiefly an attack and no positive 
hypothesis will be proposed. 
Section 3.3 criticises the sceptical paradox in the imiform response view, because 
we need not agree with Kiipke's argument that there is no such thing as rule-following. 
The reason is that we know how to follow a rule not by an interpretation of a rule in 
isolation but by understanding a rule with respect to a certain background, that is, facts 
about us as human beings, including facts about our habits, abilities and environment. 
As a result, it is not true to claim that a rule can be interpreted freely with impunity, 
because outlandish interpretations are ruled out. In other words, with such background 
information at hand，we can distinguish the domain of uses that makes sense to us from 
the one that does not. 
On this view, the actual presence of others or social relations to them make up part 
of the background, or speakers' meaning something successfully to each other 
presupposes that they share the same background information. These constitute the third 
specific sense of the social nature of meaning. 
3. However, the presence of a background can only delimit which type of language use 
makes sense to us, it cannot help us to pinpoint the exact meaning of a linguistic 
expression (a word or a sentence). Section 3.4 presents Brandom's proposal that 
meaning (the propositional content) of a declarative sentence (an assertion), the basic 
unit of judgement, is identified by its "broadly inferential articulation," which includes 
its inferential role in reasoning, and its noninferential relations to the circumstances as 
well as the consequences of use. 
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Roughly speaking, the inferential role of a sentence is the relation between the 
sentence, those that can stand as reasons for it, and those it serves a reason for. While 
the noninferential relations of a sentence to the circumstances and consequences refer to 
the propriety of the inference from its circumstances to its consequences of use. In short, 
the meaning of a sentence is identified by its inferential role in reasoning, perception, 
and action. 
In the same section of 3.4，I will further present Brandom's view (1994, 2000) that 
the meaning fixing process is carried out during interpersonal communication. Unlike 
the contractarian view, speakers need not share any common understanding of meanings 
at the start of communication. On the contraiy, a successful establishment of two distinct 
perspectives—a speaker's and a scorekeeper's is the key for the participants to grasp 
what each other is talking about (that is, what a speaker means) during the process of 
communication. 
I will explain in detail and provide examples in section 3.4.2 on how this 
scorekeeping scheme works. Since this way of fixing meanings requires at least two 
different perspectives, which are usually held by two different people in communication, 
it constitutes the fourth specific sense of the social nature of meaning. 
5. Section 3.5, the last part of this chapter, will examine a serious challenge to 
Brandom's view of fixing meanings by scorekeeping. The objection is that an 
individual's capability to fix meanings is self-sufficient, as the same person, a "solitaiy 
thinker", can establish different perspectives. Thus, not only the fourth specific sense of 
the sociality thesis, but also the general sense of the thesis are challenged. 
Then I propose a threefold reply. First of all, I argue that the case of the solitaiy-
thinker is an exception rather than the norm. Second, I argue that the ability to be a 
solitary thinker is learned through communal training and presupposes ttie possibility of 
social articulation. Third, the factor of others' involvement, though indirect, is 
indi^ensable for explaining why an individual means something successfully. 
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3.2 Criticism of the Sceptical Solution: No One Checks the Community 
1. The imifonn response view holds that there is no such thing as rule-following. The 
community standard of use regularities remains the only standard against which to 
confirm whether or not a speaker means something successfully. And speakers in a 
Kripkean community just equate their standard of correctness with usage patterns. 
But it is natural for us to ask: If a person is checked against the commmiity 
standard, who is checking the community? There are lots of cases in histoiy showing 
that the majority of a community can go wrong, leaving the genuine rule-followers as 
"deviants". For instance, if the conimimity standard is the only standard of meaning, 
when most people change one day to call a stag a horse, those few who insist on calling 
the stag a stag will be regarded by the majority as deviants. 
The pitfall of basing the notion of correctness on a community is that correctness 
does not appeal to a rule, instead it appeals to that particular pattern of uses demonstrated 
by the community members. So long as an individual conforms with this widespread 
and consistent pattern, her use of a linguistic term is judged to be correct At the 
community level, there is no way to find out if this widespread and consistent pattern is 
correct. Crispin Wright (1980) summarises the situation as: 
None of us unilaterally can make sense of the idea of correct employment of 
language save by reference to the authority of securable communal assent on the 
matter; and for the community itself there is no authority，so no standard to meet, 
(p. 220) 
2. A community view holder may reply that since the practices constituting a linguistic 
community make sense within that particular community, that is, a majority of people are 
doing so, therefore it also makes sense to regard the practices as standard of correctness. 
If we shift grounds and ask what guarantees that the concepts in a practice even 
make sense, then the answer is that nothing guarantees this except the 
functioning of the practice itself. (Fogelin, 1987: 182) 
However, if this reply is allowed to be made to protect the public language, such type of 
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protection can be applied in principle to a private language. The community view holder 
may be guilty of being selective without any good reason. 
The community view holder may further reply that practices by an individual do not 
qualify as meaning. But then he has to answer McDowell's (1984: 252-3) query: 
P]f regularities in the verbal behaviour of an isolated individual, described in 
norm-free terms, do not add up to meaning, it is quite obscure how it could 
somehow make all the difference if there are several individuals with matching 
regularities. 
The reason is that if we do not grant that an individual understands a meaning and then 
employs a linguistic term to mean something successfully, other individuals, considered 
one by one, will be on the same footing as this individual, 
this supposed communal understanding would be in exactly the same position as 
my supposed idiolectic understanding. We cannot hold, then, that the community 
"goes right or wrong", by the lights of its understanding’ when it awards my 
action the title "execution of the order"; “rather, it just goes". (McDowell, 1984; 
233) 
Therefore, if we allow that a community just goes along with its practice and that it 
does not make sense to ask why it goes on in this way, we must also make such an 
allowance for individuals. Otherwise we are guilty of being selective without good 
reason. At the same time, if we allow that a commimity of linguistic users is capable of 
fixing meanings merely by exhibiting regularities of use, we must also allow that 
individuals could do so. 
Both allowances are fatal to the community view in the Kripkean sense. As once 
the allowance is given to an individual, the community is rendered dispensable. An 
individual alone is capable of fixing meanings. 
(I will discuss more about the relation between use regularities and meanings in 
section 3.4.1 "Meanings and Inferential Roles”.） 
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3.3 Meaning and Background 
1. Besides querying whether Kripke's commimity view (his sceptical solution) is viable, 
we may also ask whether Kripke's sceptical paradox is valid. The paradox that there is 
no such thing as rule-following is based on the idea that an infinite number of rules are 
compatible with a finite number of past usages. (Kripke, 1982: 14) And there is nothing 
in a person's "internal mental history or external behaviour," (Ibid: 21) which can be 
cited to claim definitely that a spe^er is following a certain rule governing a particular 
language use, rather than following other rules. Since to mean something is to apply a 
rule-governed use of a word or a sentence, the speaker cannot claim definitely that she 
means this rather than that. As a result, 
There can be no such thing as meaning anything by any word. Each new 
application we make is a leap in the dark; any present intention could be 
interpreted so as to accord with anything we may choose to do. (Ibid: 55. My 
Italics.) 
According to this view, any ordinary utterance like "Give me a hamburger" can mean 
anything. I will argue that this sceptical view can be refuted by considering the role of 
background information inherent in the world the speaker and the hearer live. 
Although an infinite number of rules is compatible with the same finite instants of 
behaviour? it need not pose the aforementioned problem for meanings, especially the 
meaning of words and sentences in everyday usage. This is because in everyday usage 
of words and sentences, each application is embedded in a particular kind of speech 
context (a certain language game), which is delimited by linguistic and non-linguistic 
facts. In this section I would like to focus on the nonlinguistic facts, in particular to 
explain how such facts help fix meanings. In the following section I will discuss how 
language uses are related to (or articulated with) each other. 
2 To argue against the multiple interpretabilities of rules is not the only way to argue against 
Kripke's arguments. For instance some philosophers (e.g., Norwich, 1998: ch. 10; Goldfarb, 
1985) have pointed out that Kripke's formulation of the sceptical paradox is false. Goldfarb 
(1985) and Hoffman (1985) also spot another defect in Kripke's solution which based on 
uniform responses. As such uniformity must invoke the identification of token/type relation, a 
kind of rule-following is thus already presumed. 
3 Fang (2002:1) calls this problem "the interpretability of rules", however, I would like to call it 
the multiple interpretability of rules. 
35 
Background inforniation plays a necessaiy role in fixing meanings because such 
facts (or facts of nature)* delimit which games can be played (that is, they distinguish 
between rules that make sense to the speakers and listeners, and those do not), although 
background information alone is insufficient to determine exactly which rule(s) of the 
language-games should be followed. To draw an analogy, the presence of gravity is not 
part of the rules of a soccer game, but this fact of nature delimits which kind of rule 
makes sense for a soccer game on earth. A soccer game following rules for earth-players 
would become ridiculous if it were played under zero-gravity condition, and the game 
would be vastly different in a world with no such thing as gravity. 
Similarly, with relevant facts of nature taken into consideration, we find utterances 
like "A cat is on the mat," or "Give me a hamburger" effortlessly intelligible, simply 
because a lot of outlandish interpretations have been precluded. The more facts of nature 
available to listeners, the fewer the number of plausible interpretations they will 
consider. 
In this sense, rational beings endowed with a different set of facts of nature might 
find our ordinary language uses utterly strange. For instance in a world in which objects 
like a cat and a mat change positions randomly, or the normal size of a hamburger is like 
a container truck, its inhabitants would not be able to fix the meanings of our sentences 
about cats and hamburgers easily. 
Hence, the presence of background information eliminates the possibility that rules 
can be interpreted randomly with impunity. Conversely, the background information 
plays an important role in fixing the meaning of linguistic expressions by telling the 
speakers which kinds of interpretations make sense? Since the background information 
marks out a framework of language usages that make sense to us，we can also refer to it 
as framework conditions. 
2. Background information is not just helpful but necessaiy in fixing meanings. Facts of 
nature include at least a) physical regularities, e.g., we experience that the colour, shape 
在 It is called tacts of nature, in contrast to institutional facts created by human. 
5 That is, I would agree to Fang's (2002:5) conclusion in this aspect: "For any rule R, there is a 
way of distinguishing R itself from all those rules that are derived from R by taking R out of its 
complicated surrounding and then subjecting R to different interpretations." 
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and size of common objects remain roughly stable over time and do not change 
randomly,® b) biological facts we share, e.g., genetic make-up, similar patterns of 
responses to certain stimuli, like feeling pain when being hit by a stick, forming a red 
image when coming across a red thing/ and c) sodo-histoiical and environmental facts 
of a people, e.g., a shared culture, historical happenings, climate and physical 
surroundings.® 
Since we fix the meaning of a linguistic expression by fixing how it is used in rule-
governed ways in everyday circumstances, inevitably it relates somehow to some of 
these physical, biological, or sodo-historical facts. It is therefore impossible to come up 
with a use of linguistic expression that has no relation with any aspect of this world, and 
at the same time to demand that an ordinary person in this world would be able to 
determine what it means. 
Although such facts of nature state some contingent facts, this background of 
framework conditions is simply taken for granted, as it is "anchored in all my questions 
and answers, so anchored that I cannot touch it." (Wittgenstein, 1974: §103. Italics 
original.) 
Hence, when deciding which way of language use (that is, rule-following) is 
correct, background information is not just a helpful factor but in fact a necessary factor. 
3. A sense-making utterance is delimited by background information, which can relate 
to other people in three ways. First, the actual presence of other people or the speaker's 
social relations to others make up part of the background. Second, background 
information is always public and is potentially shared by many people. Third, any 
successful communication must talk about something in the background shared by the 
speaker and the hearer. 
First, under normal circumstance, the presence of other people and the speaker's 
social relations to them constitute part of the background. Normally the speaker will not 
^ For instance, a cricket match may be incomprehensible to inhabitants whose planet has only 
two dimensions. 
7 For instance, "killing is wrong" will probably get another meaning for a tribe whose members 
never die. 
8 For instance, most people calculate according to the decimal system. 
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be alone in the world she lives. Some language games involve institutional speech acts 
show this point clearly, for instance, that "she is getting married this weekend" implies 
the presence of a man. Furthermore, relations to others, like parent/offspring relation, or 
speaker/hearer relation’ are inevitable. 
Second, facts of nature inherent in a world is shared among its inhabitants because 
a) it is more reasonable (or less problematic) to presume that we, as humans, experience 
physical facts or events in similar ways, b) we are endowed with a particular set of 
biological traits which directly or indirectly affect our behaviour, and c) large groups of 
people li ve in a roughly similar environment and mature in a similar culture. 
Third, this sharing of background information also relates to communication in the 
sense that if others understand what a speaker means, one precondition of this 
understanding is that the linguistic expressions the speaker uses must connect to at least 
some objects, events, mental states, or behaviour that are potentially understood or even 
actually shared by the speaker and the listener. That is, the speaker must relate her 
language uses to items situated within the background known to the listener. The more 
these items are missing, the harder meaningful communication is. Wittgenstein (1958: 
223) says, "If a lion could talk, we could not understand it." As a lion would inherit a 
background drastically different from ours. Another example is that a listener who has 
never seen or heard of cricket before will not be able to fix the meanings of words or 
sentences used in a commentary of a cricket match on radio. 
Also, once an utterance relates to some facts of nature, such relations will delimit 
the domain in which the use of a linguistic expression makes sense to the speakers living 
within that particular background. In a sense, these relations to the background help fix 
the proper uses of the expressions, that is, background helps fix the meanings. 
4. Summing up, the background to our linguistic practice is a necessaiy factor in fixing 
linguistic meaning. And this background is constituted by facts of nature. First of all, the 
actual presence of other people and the speaker's social relations to others make up part 
9 Quite a few philosophers have already noticed the importance of this surrounding factors and 
called it the form of life (Wittgenstein, 1958:226), or background (Searle, 1995: Chapter 6), or 
implicit knowledge (Habermas, 1984:335-7). 
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of it. Second, it is always public and thus potentially shared by the speakers. Third，it is 
indispensable for communication, because without it there will be nothing for language 
to be about (that is, no content). 
That meaning presupposes a background is the third specific sense of the social 
nature of meaning. A group of speakers who share a common background have the 
potential to form a linguistic community. This community is distinguished by sharing an 
understanding of particular facts of nature which delimit particular language-games, not 
by any prior agreement on the content of meanings (as in the contractarian view), or by a 
brute consistency of responses under certain circumstances (as in the uniform response 
v iew) . 
However, the discussion thus far does not show that others must be actually 
present. They may be absent at the moment the speaker utters something, and we might 
still consider the speaker to have meant something successfully. Normally two people 
are present during communication, but it is not yet clear whether the actual presence of 
others is necessary. 
Hence, that a speaker employs a linguistic expression to mean something 
successfully need not imply conceptually that there is another person on the scene. This 
is the case when people write diaries or novels. They know what they are writing about 
but there need not be any actual reader. (This is the case of using acquired public skills, I 
will discuss the case of using self-invented language in section 3.5.2.1.) 
I will explore deeper this line of objection in section 3.5 "Objections and Replies". 
For the time being, I will be satisfied to show that the uses of linguistic expressions to 
mean something must be delimited by the background inherent in the world the speaker 
lives. And such delimitation involves other people directly or indirectly in the following 
three ways: first, the actual presence of other people or the speaker's social relations to 
others make up part of the background; second, background information is always 
10 Fang (2002) argues that the introduction of a background may be the beginning to combat 
the interpretability of rules, as the threats from Quine's theses of indeterminacy of translation 
and inscrutability of reference are looming. The common source of these theses is global 
descriptivism which demands that "connection between (an expression of) a rule and acts the 
rule dictates as fully expressible in sentence." (p. 7) Fang points out that no matter how 
complete a description is, it "always presupposes a background ... there is always something 
left that is not described." (p. 8) Fang adds that such a reply is only a preliminary start as it 
requires more arguments to soundly discredit these theses. 
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public and is potentially shared by many people; third, any successful communication 
must talk about something in the background shared by the speaker and the hearer. The 
first point concerns the actual presence of other people, while the other two points refer 
to indirect involvement Yet this indirect involvement is important, for it is indispensable 
for explaining why a speaker is able to mean something intelligible not only to herself, 
but also to others. 
3 . 4 Inferential Roles and Scorekeeping 
The previous section presents the view that background inforaiation plays an essential 
role in fixing meaning. The reason is that any linguistic expression must relate in some 
way to some nonlinguistic facts in this world, which constitute the background for both 
the speaker and the listeners. The uses of this linguistic expression are therefore 
anchored (or delimited), at least partially, by such relations, which distinguish between 
sense-making and meaningless sounding. 
I will present in this section the view that language uses can be further delimited by 
the relations between a linguistic expression and other linguistic expressions. Thus, the 
meaning of an expression is fixed by what Brandom calls its "broadly inferential 
articulation," which includes its inferential role in reasoning, and its noninferential 
relations to the circumstances as well as the consequences of use. Roughly speaking, the 
inferential role of a sentence is the relation between the sentence, those that can stand as 
reasons for it, and those it serves a reason for. While the noninferential relations of a 
sentence to the circumstances and consequences refer to the propriety of the inference 
from its circumstances to its consequences of use. In short, the meaning of a sentence is 
identified by its inferential role in reasoning, perception, and action. This view is 
Brandom's strong inferentialism (1994，2000).'' 
Based on this way of understanding meanings, Brandom proposes his 
11 For an exposition of inferential theory before Brandom, please refer to his teacher Wilfrid 
Sellars, e.g. (1953) "Inference and Meaning" or (1997) Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind. 
And what Brandom calls strong inferentialism is in contrast to weak inferentialism and 
hyperinferentialism. The distinguishing features between these three are as follows. Weak 
inferentialism claims that inferential articulation is a necessary aspect of conceptual content. 
Strong inferentialism claims that broadly inferential articulation is sufficient to determine 
conceptual content. While hyperinferentialism claims that narrowly inferential articulation is 
sufficient to determine conceptual content, (q.v. Brandom 2000: 219-220, n4) 
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scorekeeping scheme of ascribing meanings to speakers' claims. Since this scheme 
requires a distinction between two perspectives, which are usually held by different 
people during communication, for Brandom, it is a social process. This view also 
constitutes the fourth specific sense of the sociality thesis. 
3.4.1 Meanings and Inferatial Roles 
According to Brandom's strong inferentialism (1994，2000), the meaning (the 
propositional content) of a declarative sentence (an assertion), the basic unit of 
judgement, is identified by its inferential role in reasoning, perception, and action. 
When a person utters an assertion, she expresses some infomiation. Considering 
this piece of information as a reason, she or others can make further assertions. On the 
contrary others may ask her to justify her assertions by providing grounds to back up the 
original utterance. Under such ways of giving and asking for reasons, these assertions 
are articulated together. We may regard an assertion as a move in a language-game called 
the "game of giving and asking for reasons.'"^ A meaning (conceptual content, in 
Brandom's words (1994:4)) thus functions either as a reason for, or an implication of 
another meaning. We may regard meanings as inferentially articulated in a web of 
meanings. 
Brandom points out that there are norms guiding the inferences. Such norms are 
called material inferences, in contrast to formally valid inferences. A typical formally 
valid inference is any inference for sentential logic, for example modus ponens or 
modus toUens. A grasp of a formally valid inference is a grasp of its form. A material 
inference is different in the sense that a "good inference" depends on the meaning 
(content) of relevant concepts, not on the form. To infer from "CUHK is to the north of 
HKU" to "HKU is to the south of CUHK" is good simply because of the meanings 
(content) of the concepts north and south. Sometimes, such material inferences are 
expressed as platitudes like “It is sunny, therefore the sand on the beach will be hot," or 
Brandom attributes frequently that the phrase originated from Sellars (e.g. 1994:139,167; 
1997:123; 2000:189). For Brandom, the game of giving and asking for reasons is specifically 
for assertions. Habemnas (1984) expresses a similar view on the necessity of justifying claims 
by reasons, but the scope of justification is not limited to assertions but also includes normative 
claims and self-expressions. (Section I, Chapter 1) 
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"Your dress is blue, therefore it is coloured•” 
When we say that a person fixes the meaning of a word or a sentence, this person 
must not be limited to demonstrating a reliable response towards this linguistic stimuli, 
since machines or trained animals, which do not grasp meaning, can do this as well. 
When using a linguistic expression, in addition to behaving properly in a regular 
manner，a speaker must show that she has grasped the role of this linguistic expression 
in the inferential game of making claims and giving and asking for reasons. (Brandom, 
2000:48) She must be able to treat that "This pen is red" is incompatible with "This pen 
is blue," or that since "This pen is blue," therefore "This pen is coloured," or that "It is 
sunny" is a good reason for "The sand on the beach is hot." 
To grasp a meaning is to be able to employ a word or a sentence in its inferential 
role in reasoning, perception, and action.‘斗 The meaning of a sentence lies in its 
inferential role with respect to other sentences, that is whether it can function as reason 
to others or as implication from others. The meaning of a word is determined by its role 
in determining the meaning of the whole sentence—in other words, its contribution to 
the inferential significance of the sentence. 
This section (3.4.1) explains that to grasp the meaning of a word or sentence is to 
grasp its inferential role in reasoning, perception, and action. The next section will 
explain how speakers (and listeners) understand the meanings by grasping relevant 
inferential roles of the linguistic expressions during communication. That constitutes 
another specific sense of the social thesis, namely that the fixing of meanings involves 
two perspectives, which are usually held by different people, during the process of 
communication. 
13 For the significance of behavioural regularities, please refer to the earlier discussion in 
section 3.2. 
14 Compare with what Haugeland (1998:356 n11) says, "I maintain that telling can be objective 
only insofar as it is not only responsive but also responsible~Vr\aX is, as it essentially involves 
an active taking of responsibility both for the correctness of individual responses and for the 
responsive capacities themselves. Thus, to this extent at least, the account of objective telling 
will parallel what Kant says about the essential unity of receptivity and spontaneity (passivity 
and activity) in object intuition." 
Here is an application of the principle of compositionality which states that the meaning of 
sentence is a function of the meanings of its smaller meaningful parts. Please refer to Davidson 
(1965) Theories of Meaning and Leamable Languages" (p. 8). 
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3.4.2 Scorekeeping 
When we try to understand what a foreigner means by her words, a common strategy is 
to compare her linguistic and linguistically related behaviour to ours. That is, although 
she is not a member of our linguistic community actually, we treat her as a notional 
member. Through this analogy with us, we determine whether this speaker is following 
some kind of rules when using her language to mean something. 
If it is possible to employ the method of notional analogy to determine whether a 
foreigner means something successfully, one cannot help but wonder if such a method 
can be expanded so that each person constructs others' meanings without the 
presupposition of linguistic conventions. All the communicating participants do is to 
ascribe meanings to others in an z^propriate way. This is the scorekeeping strategy 
proposed (or perfected) by Brandom (1994 and 2000). Although the comparison of 
language use with scorekeeping is not new (it dates at least back to Lewis (1979)), 
Brandom's version is the most fully developed version of such a view in the sense that it 
discusses many facets of language, like semantics, pragmatics, meaning, truth, belief, 
norms, and many others. 
Scorekeeping is common in games, and scores are not limited to results, but also 
include a whole range of relevant statistics during the progress of the games. There may 
also be markers (or counters) in a game to record or express the moves. To draw an 
analogy between other games and language game, the sentences uttered by each person 
in a language game can be thought of as such markers. For every player at any moment, 
there are two distinct sets of sentences. One contains the sentences she is disposed to 
assert, the other contains those she is not disposed to assert. The first set is put on her 
scoresheet. Making a move (making an assertion) alters a player's scoresheet 
accordingly. Furthermore in a language game’ it is not the referee or umpire keeping one 
scoresheet, but eveiy player keeps a scoresheet for each individual player, including 
oneself. 
To play one counter "can commit one to playing others." (Brandom, 2000: 190) 
When a student asserts, "I'm going to interview the department head in five minutes." 
She is obliged to include also in her scoresheet "I'm going to interview someone 
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shortly." These two assertions stand in a kind of inheritance relation, the utterance of the 
first implies the other. But she ought not to say at the same time, "I'm going to swim in 
five minutes," because participating in one activity at one location commonly precludes 
the participation in another activity at another location. Such assertions (commitments) 
are incompatible with each other. And all these commitments form a web of inferential 
relations. In short, making a move in the assertion game is acknowledging a 
commitment, which is inferentially articulated with other commitments. Brandom (2000) 
calls these coimmtments the responsibilities a speaker takes. The distinguishing feature 
between a commitment to a claim and just a brute sounding-off is 
whether one treats [the claim] as the undertaking of a commitment that is suitably 
articulated by its consequential relations to other coimmtments. (p. 192) 
This is also the idea discussed in 3.4.1. 
In addition to making commitments, an assertion places a person in the position of 
being responsible for justifying such commitment. The speaker is liable to give reason(s) 
to justify why she is entitled to make assertional moves. To quote the above example, 
when asked why she is going to meet the department head, she may reply, "The student 
newspaper has arranged an interview with her•” This utterance which is put forward as a 
reason is also inferentially related to what was said previously. 
To understand assertions this way is to grasp the meaning (propositional content) 
of the sentences uttered in an inferentially articulated manner. Moreover, during a 
conversation, the set of coimmtments ascribed to each speaker will be altered. For 
instance, we consider initially that after saying "I'm going to interview the department 
head in five minutes," the student is not entitled to say ‘Tin going to swim in five 
Such incompatibility relation differs in extent, being wholly green is incompatible with being 
wholly red, but an object can be (partly) green and (partly) red. The example of "interview" and 
"swim" turns out that the student is going to perform both at the same time. So these two 
acti viti es are commonly incompatible, but under some special circumstances, they are not. 
17 Baker and Hacker (1990:322) express a similar point regarding commitment and justification 
when they say, "Lack of thought is characterized by one's inability or unwillingness to explain or 
justify what one said," and "Saying something 'with thought'... typically involves a commitment. 
One might compare it to playing a card in a game of cards. One must be prepared to defend 
what one says, to explain it, act on it in appropriate circumstances, take credit or incur debt for it, 
stand by it, and so on." 
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minutes." But she actually says both, "I'm going to interview the department head in 
five minutes," and "I'm going to swim in five minutes." Presuming that both assertions 
are true, the commitment ascribed to her becomes: "I'm going to interview the 
department head while we are swimming." 
As I said before, in this model no prior linguistic conventions concerning the 
content of meanings are needed, all that is required is that each scorekeeper ascribes 
commitments to speakers. At the same time each scorekeeper also acknowledges his 
own status by keeping a scoresheet on himself, recording his own commitments and 
entitiements. It is obvious that what a speaker means by employing certain linguistic 
expressions and what the scorekeeper takes those expressions to mean may be different. 
Such variance is regarded as normal rather than exceptional. 
In our exan^le, from the scorekeeper's perspective, the terms 'Interview", 
"department head", "swim", etc. may have inferential roles quite different from their 
roles according to the speaker's perspective. For instance, for the scorekeeper, "to 
swim" means to move through water by moving the limbs, but for the speaker "to 
swim" may mean to play mahjong!'® 
To continue communication does not require that the participants share the 
meanings, the only requirement is that they can go on keeping (maybe different) scores 
on each other. While keeping the scores is ascribing inferential roles on the commitments 
and entitlements of all players in the conversation (that is, the utterances actually spoken 
and liable to be spoken by them). Since the meaning of a linguistic expression can be 
identified by locating its inferential role in reasoning, perception, and action, 
scorekeeping amounts to ascribing meanings to various utterances during the process of 
communication. 
For Brandom's scorekeeping scheme, the determination of meaning requires two 
distinct perspectives, namely the speaker's and the scorekeeper's. The former refers to 
what the speaker, to whom the commitment is ascribed, would acknowledge. The latter 
refers to what the scorekeeper, who specifies what the speaker's claim is talking about, 
18 In Cantonese, "to swim" sometimes means to play mahjong as the movement of the upper 
limbs in shuffling the mahjong pieces and in swimming breast stroke are quite similar. Maybe in 
our example, the department head to be interviewed by the student is the head of the 
mahjong department at a games institute. 
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would acknowledge. In Brandom's idiom (2000: ff. 169)，the former is a de dicto 
ascription (an ascription according to the words said), the latter is a de re ascription (an 
ascription according to what the claim is about). 
As a result, the scorekeeper is keeping two perspectivally different specifications of 
the content with respect to a claim made by a speaker, the first one "that speaker says 
that such-and-such” (the de dicto ascription), and the second one “I，as a scorekeeper, 
thinks that that speaker is talking about so-and-so when she is making that claim" (the 
de re ascription). To determine the meaning of a claim requires not only the speaker's 
perspective alone (specifying who makes which claim), but also the scorekeeper，s 
perspective (specifying which object, event, mental state or behaviour is picked out by 
the claim). 
Since the nature of scorekeeping requires a distinction between two perspectives in 
the foregoing way, for Brandom, it is thus social. It is also the fourth specific sense of 
the sociality thesis. 
To sum up, a new specific sense of the sociality thesis is established in the sense that 
meaning is determined by at least two perspectives—the speaker's and the 
scorekeeper's—involving two (or more) parties during a process of communication, 
which mainly consists of the linguistic moves of giving and asking reasons. A particular 
meaning understood in this manner is not only inferentially articulated with other 
meanings, it is socially articulated in the sense that two or more parties are involved in 
the process of scorekeeping, and thus communication. 
3.5 Objections and Replies 
This section will consider a serious objection not only to the fourth specific sense of the 
sociality thesis, but also to the general sense of the thesis. The objection claims that a 
normal person, a solitary thinker, can establish both speaker's and scorekeeper's 
perspectives in fixing meanings. Therefore, during the meaning-fixing process, no other 
person need be present. 
After discussing the objection, I will put forward a threefold reply. First, I will 
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argue that solitary thinking is an exception rather than the norm; all people, including the 
solitary thinker, need to acquire the necessary linguistic skills in a community, and 
constant solitary thinking is rare, while constant solitary thinking with a self-invented 
language will be even rarer. Second, I will show that solitary thinking presupposes the 
possibility of social articulation. Third, indirect involvement of others is an 
indispensable factor when explaining why a speaker can mean something intelligible not 
only to herself, but also to others. 
3.5.1 One Thinker, Two Perspectives 
The last section presented a new specific sense of sociality thesis: meaning is socially 
articulated, because any attribution of meanings requires two different perspectives, the 
scorekeeper's and the speaker's. This scorekeeping model has attracted discussions and 
criticism?�Focusing on the sociality thesis, if meaning is articulated by an interplay 
between two different perspectives—a scorekeeper's and a speaker's—one may query 
why one person cannot hold two perspectives at the same time. If that is possible, then 
this specific sense of the sociality thesis, and even the general sense of the thesis, seem 
open to question. 
Gibbard (1996) suggests that even if the scorekeeping thesis is held, it "needn't be 
...discursive scorekeeping, with two or more people discussing." (p. 716. Italics 
original.) Gibbard proposes the following reply: 
[TJhis "claiming to oneself must be understood by reference to claiming things 
to others. The “score” in question must be in the first instance social. • • (Ibid) 
But Gibbard thinks that such a reply fails as he asks why it is not the masteiy of 
discursive practice modelled after thinking, full-fledged mental inferences. (Ibid) 
In a nutshell, even if a scorekeeping model actually works, the sociality thesis need 
not follow. The reason is that a person is capable of gathering up-to-date information 
about how the same utterance looks from different perspectives only if he can handle 
19 The most extensive discussion is a symposium on Brandom's Making It Explicit, in 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1997). There is also a review of Brandom's 
book in the previous issue of the journal (Gibbard, 1996:699-717). Also Haugeland (1998: 
356-8 n14). And a review by Fodor and Lepore (2001) on Brandom (2000). 
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temporal changes in perspective, with respect to his memory (of the past), current 
experience (of the present) or hypotheticals (of the future). Therefore, shifting 
perspectives within a solitary thinker is not any rare or novel happening, because any 
person need to cope with the shift if he is engaging in remembering or planning. (Ibid: 
704) 
Gibbard's crucial point can also be understood as follows. When an agent makes a 
judgement ji at some time t„ he is making the judgement from a particular perspective pi 
at ti. Some time later ( t j , when he makes an inferentially related judgement about j„ he 
is making i from a new perspective pa, which is different from p,. The agent, holding 
perspective p^  att^, needs to consider what j, means from the perspective p” before he 
can make a sensible judgement j2. That is, he must consider whether ji is a reason for, or 
an implication from, j之.He must also make sure that j, and are compatible with each 
other. Employing the scorekeeping scheme, we regard the agent as thinking from a 
continuum of perspectives over time, with later perspectives ascribing meanings 
constantly to the judgements made from earlier perspectives. Yet all these perspectives 
are occupied by the same agent throughout the process, and no social discursive practice 
is required. Thus it shows that Brandom's sociality thesis does not follow necessarily 
from his scorekeeping thesis. 
Fraser (2001: 72) presents this one-person-two-perspectives case as: 
eveiy individual who learns to speak a language and to be a discursive 
scorekeeper thereby internalises the space of reasons, takes up both of the 
perspectives Brandom describes, and holds herself answerable to rational norms 
and objective facts. The two "socially distinct" perspectives of the one who 
attributes deontic statuses and the one to whom they're attributed collapse into 
the body of one person. 
The crux of these criticisms amounts to saying that so long as a being is self-conscious, 
she is still able to engage in /w^personal mental inferences which articulate meanings 
over time, in a process similar to those of mterpersonal interactions. 
If this one-thinker-two-perspectives view stands, not only the scorekeeping sense 
of the sociality thesis, but the general sense of the tiiesis defended in this essay thus far 
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will be refuted. 
3.5.2 Three Replies 
I am going to answer this challenge by appealing to three lines of argument. First of all I 
point out that social articulation, not constant solitary thinking, is the norm. Second, I 
argue that the one-thinker-two-perspectives mode cannot be possible unless social 
articulation is presumed. Third, the involvement of others in fixing a meaning need not 
be direct, indirect involvement is indispensable for explaining how the meaning of a 
linguistic expression is intelligible not only to the speaker, but also to others严 
I 
3.5.2.1 An Exception, not the Norm 
1.1 call the one-thinker-two-perspectives model the solitary-thinker model. It is true that 
besides taking part in interpersonal communication, normal competent speakers are able 
to think alone. There is also nothing preventing the speaker's perspective and the 
scorekeeper's perspective from collapsing into one, namely that the speaker just 
acknowledges and understands what she means directly. I suppose everyone takes this 
to be true and not unusual. 
However, it will be not so normal for a solitary thinker to think (or speak) alone on 
all occasions but never to communicate with others. It is not unreasonable for others to 
find out why this solitaiy thinker behaves so, maybe she does so imder oath, or due to 
isolation upon an accident or a special mission, etc.. In short, we take it that social 
These are not the only replies to the challenge, I can think of a fourth one. It is the strategy of 
arguing for the relation between meaning and wide content of mental states. It is the line of 
reasoning adopted by Putnam (1975), Burge (1979), Kiipke (1980) and Norwich (1998). Since 
this line of reasoning leads out of the focus of this essay and far into the field of philosophy of 
mind, I would be satisfied with just mentioning its feasibility here. 
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communication is normal, while being a constant solitary thinker is an exception.^' 
Therefore, even if we grant that the solitary-thinker mode is possible, such a case 
can be compatible witii the sociality tiiesis if we understand the general sense of the 
sociality thesis as holding that determining the meaning of a linguistic expression 
generally involves at least two parties. The word 'generally' is used to emphasise that it 
is often�not always, the case so. And it is possible for a solitaiy thinker to determine 
meanings, provided that she has grasped the implicit concepts of commitment and 
entitlement through discursive practices in a multi-party environment. But meaning 
determination remains largely social despite this solitary-thinker possibility, because first 
of all, it is the norm rather than the exception, second, once communication takes place, 
the solitaiy-thinker mode will be displaced naturally by the multi-party mode, 
2. A radical variant of the solitary-thinker mode is to imagine that there is a human 
being, with no contact with others since birth, and this person can invent a language to 
record his activities or to express his thought, etc. Since this person is alone, he engages 
in solitary thinking all the time. 
My reply to this objection is that although such a counterexample is possible, the 
possibility of a creature developing linguistic ability without social acculturation is 
exceedingly slim. It is not supported by any empirical observation thus far and not 
supported by any explanation why how this possibility can be so. (Yule, 1996: 24) 
But even if this possibility is allowed for the sake of argument, when the meaning 
of a word or sentence is understood as its use in ordinary circumstances, the 
counterexample of a permanently solitary thinker will be so outre that placing "undue 
emphasis on outr^ possibilities" becomes the weakness of the objection. (Canfield, 
Interconnectedness is also a distinguishing feature of any language game, including 
soliloquy. Rush Rhees (1998) emphasises this point when he is arguing that the calls and 
responses performed by Wittgenstein's builders (Wittgenstein, 1958: §2) could not be 
regarded as a primitive language, "unless it were connected with the use of language outside 
the building operation." (p. 131) 'This has to do with the fact that language games are 
connected with one another." (Ibid: 128) However Norman Malcolm (1989b) put forward a reply 
that any connection to the outside is unnecessary as "[the builders'] only form of social 
organization is in their building activity, which for them is endlessly absorbing.... [It] might be 
the whole language of a tribe." (p. 181)1 agree with Rhees as I find Malcolm's reply can only be 
raised merely for the sake of argument. 
50 
1996: 488) 
3. This "exception-rather-than-the-norai" reply allows that even if solitary thinking is 
possible, it is not false to say that language is normally social. Canfield (1996: 479) 
draws an analogy to illustrate this point. 
Chess is essentially^ a two-(or more)-party game. Still, it is possible to play 
chess against oneself. Chess remains essentially communal despite that 
possibility, because were all chess to be of the solitaire variety a tremendous 
amount would change: imagine a chess club, a chess tournament, a chess 
grandmaster or a world champion in the world of solitary chess. 
Hence, I conclude that in spite of allowing rare exceptions to the sociality 
thesis—that is, it is not wrong to say that meaning can be theoretically non-social in the 
sense that one party is involved—it may still be right to claim that meaning is normally 
social. Therefore, I maintain that the sociality thesis still stands. 
3.5.2.2 Interdependence between Social Articulation and Solitary Thinking 
In addition to arguing that the case of a solitaiy-thinker is the exception rather than the 
norm, I will also ai^ue that (even in the exceptions) social articulation and the solitary-
thinker mode are interdependent on each other, in the sense that on the one hand solitary-
thinker mode is not viable unless social articulation is possible, and on tiie other hand, 
social articulation conceptually entails the possibility of solitary-thinker mode because 
without solitary thinking, a scorekeeper cannot keeps a reliable score. These two models 
are like two rods leaning against each other. As Davidson has remarked in a different 
context, "if any leg were lost, no part would stand." (Davidson, 1991: 220尸 
First of all, when alone a normal and competent speaker can apply her acquired 
linguistic skill to mean something successfully. This point is trivial and undisputed. 
Second, it is reasonable to think that a solitary thinker is capable of inferentially 
Canfield's (1996) use of 'essential' means that chess-playing is normally such-and-such, but 
he is not saying that chess-playing is always so. See his own clarification on p. 478. 
23 Davidson is talking about the relations among self-knowledge, knowledge of other minds and 
external world. I borrow his idea of interdependency between two different but closely-related 
concepts. 
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articulating assertions and meanings, but scorekeeping ability—the ability to attribute to 
and acknowledge commitments and entitlements—is acquired through social linguistic 
practices. This provides a preliminary answer to Gibbard's question why mental 
inference is understood against the background of social articulation, 
Third, theoretically and practically, it is imnecessaiy for any thinker to take part in 
discursive practices all the times. But the critical point is that her monologue can be 
interpreted from another perspective. Thus a solitaiy thinker is a potential participant in 
discursive practice anytime. As Brandom (1997) says, 
P]t is not necessaiy that discursive practitioners actually be interpreted by anyone 
else as engaging in such practices, in order for them genuinely to binding 
themselves by conceptual norms. It is enough that they are appropriately so 
interpretable. (p. 195) 
For a person to employ a linguistic expression to mean something successfully, it is 
necessary that there be two distinct perspectives, together with the cause correlated with 
the linguistic expression in use, forming a triangulation relationship. (Davidson, 1991: 
213) And this different-speakers-different-perspectives mode must be presumed by the 
solitary-thinker mode. 
During a discursive practice, each of the two perspectives is keeping score of a 
linguistic expression and being distinct is crucial in this triangulation. A speaker 
acknowledges what she means while a scorekeeper attributes the meaning to the speaker. 
And a speaker means something successfully only if she correlates her linguistic 
behaviour with certain objects, events, or aspects in the speaker's own world in a 
predictable manner, that is, demonstrating a regular pattern of linguistic behaviour. But 
the criterion of such use regularity cannot be derived from the speaker's behaviour; it can 
only come from the responses of an observer (scorekeeper) to the linguistic behaviour of 
Although I hesitate to claim that scorekeeping ability can only be acquired through social 
linguistic practices, I would say that it is overwhelmingly likely that this is so, as it is hard to give a 
satisfactory explanation on how this is not so. This paper assumes that the scorekeeping ability 
is developed during the acquisition of language. 
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the speaker产 It is the scorekeeper who links up what the speaker means with relevant 
items (for example, an object, an event, a mental state, certain behaviour, etc.) in the 
scorekeeper's own world. Only if the link is set up will there be common ground for the 
scorekeeper to tell whether the speaker is talking about certain items of the worlds rather 
than other items. Hence, the establishment of such a link (or correlation) leads the 
scorekeeper to fix what the speaker means. 
On the one hand the speaker uses a sentence to mean something by correlating it 
with objects, events, or aspects in her own world On the other hand the hearer observes 
that the speaker's linguistic behaviour forms similar patterns by correlating her 
behaviour to the hearer's own world of objects, events, or aspects. Not until these two 
distinct perspectives intersect can the hearer makes sense of what the speaker is talking 
about. If we regard that particular object, event, or aspect as a cause, both the speaker 
and the hearer then correlate their meanings with that cause. "A common cause has been 
determined. The triangle which gives content to thought and speech is complete. But it 
takes two to triangulate." (Davidson, 1991: 213) And only under such triangulation 
among two perspectives and an external world can wrong meanings be detected and 
The idea is based on Davidson (1991) p. 212, he is talking about object classification. I 
borrow it to argue for meaning something in speech. I suggest two reasons why the 
perspective from an external observer is required. First of all, it is related to the factor of "public 
criteria," which states that the criteria governing the uses must be understood not only by the 
speaker, but also by others. Thus the correlation between a speaker's linguistic behaviour and 
the world must also be recognisable from a viewpoint other than the speaker's. And such a 
recognition of a correlation serves in turn as a criterion of the speaker's use regularity. 
Furthermore, it concerns the aboutness (the content) of a claim. As when I present in section 
3.4.2, the significance of the interplay between the distinct perspectives of de dicto and de 
re senses of a claim, the latter sense can be either supplied by an observer, or learned 
through discursive practice, in which an external observer is present. 
The idea In the last couple of paragraphs is based on Davidson (1991). Davidson's point is 
not novel or far-tetched, indeed it can be regarded as "a banal claim": "in order tor me to find 
out that you mean by a given sign what I do,丨 have no option but to look at a broad class of the 
judgements you make using that sigh; there are, as K were’ my only evidence for your meaning 
the same." (Holtzman and Leich, 1981; 5. Italic original.) 
Please note also that the role of "use regularity" in the banal claim is different from that of 
"uniform responses" in Kripke's sceptical solution. First of all, different patterns of "use 
regularity" apply to different individuals in the banal claim while "uniform responses" over a 
particular meaning are across all linguistic members in Kripke's solution. Therefore in the banal 
claim, two people mean something similarly may demonstrate different patterns of "use 
regularity". While in Kripke's sense, two people mean something similarly must conform to a 
"uniform response" shared in the community. Furthermore, "use regularity" is only a necessary 
condition in the banal claim for ascribing meaning to the speaker, while the conformity to 
"uniform response" is a sufficient condition for meaning-ascription in Kripke's community. 
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corrected accordingly. Or we say that a distinction between "seems right" and “is right" 
can be drawn尸 
Back to the solitary-thinks mode, this solitary thinker will only become a reliable 
perspective in scorekeeping only after she has taken part in reasonably large number of 
discursive practices during trainings (in her early age) and subsequent practising. 
Williams (1991) states the situation clearly as: 
P]individuals who have already mastered a practice or language can exercise that 
capacity independently of a social context. This independence of the individual is 
parasitic upon commimity. (p. 115，n47. Italics original.尸 
Without interpersonal commimication, it is at best facing the reasonable query if a 
solitary thinker can grasp the implicit concepts of commitment and entitlement on her 
own. At worst, if a solitary thinker is cut out totally from interpersonal interactions from 
an early age, her soliloquy may suffer from the defects of a private language, namely 
that she just cannot guarantee what seems to her a correct use is indeed correct. 
The only safeguard against this collapse into a private (and thus unintelligible) 
language is to claim that the soliloquy of this solitary thinker is potentially connectable to 
public communication (in other words, able to be socially articulated in a discursive 
practice.) However, if this potential for social articulation is required to render the 
27 Norman Malcolm (1989a) points out that "it is a thoroughly natural tendency of philosophical 
thinking to regard it as self-evident that a person who had never been a member of a human 
society could give a name to something and then go on to employ that name in that 'same' 
meaning, and could make a signpost for his own use and thereafter take his direction from it." 
(p. 170. Italic original.) However in such a case, being self-evident is illusory as "there would be 
no foothold there" for the distinction between one's actually following a rule and one's thinking 
one is following a rule be drawn. There must be a reference of use independent to an 
individual's personal usage, against which an individual's use can be gauged, (p. 171) 
28 There are two points of fundamental difference between the views held by Williams and me. 
First, Williams (1991) regards a solitary thinker mode as parasitic upon a community while I 
regard it as on the same level as social articulation. Second, Williams regards the presence of 
standards "only in virtue of group harmony and against the background of group harmony," (p. 
114. italics original.) but the scorekeeping model need not presume the preexistence of any 
group harmony. 
Also, I understand Williams's point that "the independence of the individual is parasitic upon 
community" as follows. After accepting her point that the correctness of language use is 
checked within a social context, the correctness of the use by any independent individual can 
be guaranteed only if this individual is compared with his community members when 
necessary. Thus the independence of the individual is possible only if there is such a 
community to serve as his reference, 
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solitary-thinker mode intelligible, it amounts to saying that the viability of the solitaty-
thinker mode presupposes its own potential for social articulation. The one-thinker-two-
perspectives mode is therefore not a challenge to, but interdependent with, the different-
speakers-different-perspectives mode. 
Still, Williams's claim that individual practice is parasitic upon social practice seems 
biased against solitary thinking. The different-speakers-different-perspectives mode 
must in turn depend equally on the solitary-thinker mode, in the sense that each 
scorekeeper in the discursive practice is assumed to be competent in taking up the 
scorekeeping tasks of attributing and acknowledging commitments and entitlement to all 
perspectives, including oneself, quite reliably严 The reason is obvious as under a 
coimterfactual situation in which the scorekeepers cannot keep scores themselves, the 
scorekeeping activities (discursive practices) between them just fail. That is why I 
claimed a few paragraphs ago that these two modes must rely on each other, without 
either of them, the other simply cannot stand. 
Since this line of argument will constitute a critical part of my conclusion, I would 
like to consolidate the foregoing points. The interdependence between social articulation 
and solitaiy-thinker mode can be approached from either direction. 
The case of soliloquy (no matter the language used is unique or not) must 
presuppose its own potential for social articulation so as to safeguard against the collapse 
into a private (and thus unintelligible) language. Furthermore, the capability to keep track 
of scores reliably requires a grasp of the concepts of commitment and entitlement, and 
only in social discursive practice can a person acquire such concepts. In both these 
ways, the solitary-thinker mode is dependent on social articulation. 
Conversely, scorekeeping in social articulation will not be possible if the 
participants cannot undertake solitary thinking. That is, for the scorekeeper to keep a 
correct scoresheet, he must be able to identify the cause of the speaker's utterance, and 
he must identify the cause of his own, parallel belief or utterance—so he must be already 
It may be worried that what Williams is concerned with concept-formation, and before the 
development of enough concepts, no scorekeeper in Brandom's sense can emerge. Based 
on such an interpretation, my comment on Williams's viewpoint seems unfair. However, what I 
want to emphasise here is that even though a necessary condition for solitary thinking is social 
practice, it does not imply that the latter is conceptually more fundamental, as I try to argue in 
this section. 
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in touch with the world in solitaiy-thinker mode. Consequently, solitaiy-thinker mode 
cannot be derived from social articulation but is fundamental to it. In a parallel argument, 
we can say that a precondition for acquiring scorekeeping ability is that a person be able 
to function in solitary-thinker mode. Thus social articulation is dependent on the solitaiy-
thinker mode. 
From this preliminary examination, it seems biased to claim that either social 
articulation or solitaiy-thinker mode is more fundamental. A compromise that 
accommodates the above results is to claim that social articulation and solitaiy-thinker 
mode require each other, though in different ways. Thus it makes sense to propose that 
they are interdependent. If this solution is tenable, the sociality thesis in the weak general 
sense that to determine a meaning involves at least two parties, at least indirectly, will 
still stand. But it is interesting to see that the thesis must presuppose its antithesis, 
namely that one person is capable of fixing meanings alone, while this antithesis also 
presupposes the thesis. 
3.5.2.3 Indirect involvement 
But the defender of the solitaiy-thinker mode may be dissatisfied with the above 
reply—the sociality thesis is substantially qualified but still stands—as he will point out 
that in reality the determination of meanings can often be carried out actually by one 
person alone, an obviously non-social process. And this fact flies in the face of the 
general sense of the sodality thesis that the determination of the meaning of a linguistic 
expression involves at least two parties. 
Upon this objection, I would like to clarify that involvement can take place in two 
senses: direct and indirect involvements. Direct involvement implies that the participants 
are actually present in the meaning fixing process. Prior agreement, checking against 
imiforai responses, the presence of other people in the background or interpersonal 
communication in discursive practices as discussed in this essay are typical examples. 
Conversely, indirect involvement need not require other people's actual presence. 
Other people may be referred to only in an indirect way. However, their presence must 
be taken into consideration when we attempt to explain why the solitary thinker's 
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deteraiination of meaning is possible (that is, intelligible not only to the speaker, but also 
to others). The requirement of others' understanding for public criteria, the potential 
sharing of a background, as well as the presupposition of the potential of social 
articulation are typical examples. 
As a result, 'involvement of others' means not only "the actual presence of others," 
but also "a relation with others in some way." Thus even if the solitary-thinker mode is 
viable, its possibility presupposes that the thinker stiU uses language in a rule-governed 
way, while the rules are public and can be understood by others. Fmthemiore comes in 
the factor of background, which either brings in other people directly, or must be shared 
by others if the solitary thinker tries to commimicate with others. While I just pointed out 
that in order to safeguard this solitary thinker's unique language against the collapse into 
a private language, a solitaiy-thinker's language must be able to be socially articulated in 
a discursive practice. In all these ways, other people's presence are taken into 
consideration when we attempt to explain why the solitaiy thinker's determination of 
meaning is possible. 
After having explored four specific senses of the sociality thesis, I will draw a 
conclusion in the next chapter regarding what I have presented, discussed and argued. 
I would like to clarify that indirect involvement does not refer to the fact that before becoming 
a competent language user, that is a solitary thinker, the speaker needs to take part in social 
practice tor a considerable period. My point is that, after having developed her linguistic 
capability, it is theoretically plausible that she can create new meaningful, expressions (or 
perhaps a whole language), and no one is actually present when she is speaking this language 
(all to herself). Thus, introducing the factor of indirect involvement does not beg the question 




This chapter consists of five sections. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 are a smmnaiy of the 
central question and the thesis, and a summary of 也e main arguments and results, 
respectively. In view of the discussion and results, in section 4.31 reach the 
preliminary conclusion that the sociality thesis is refuted, at least in the form stated in 
chapter one. I then add some further remarks in section 4.4. These remarks are critical, 
because I will argue that the thesis will still be defensible if we introduce some 
qualifying factors to restrict its scope. Last, in section 4.51 put forward a suggestion 
on how this research can be followed up. 
4.1 A Summary of the Central Question and the Thesis 
This essay is a study of the problem of meaning in philosophy of language. Its central 
question is: "Can a single speaker determine the meaning of a linguistic expression by 
herself, or does the process of determining meaning require the involvement of at least 
two parties?" 
The thesis I have been examining is that the determination of the meaning of a 
linguistic expression involves two or more parties. This statement I call the sociality 
thesis, the general thesis, or the sociality thesis in the general sense. I call any more 
concrete way of stating how two or more parties are involved in the determination 
process a specific sense of the sociality thesis. The general sense is a more abstract 
way of stating the thesis, while a specific sense is more concrete. 
I have examined various specific senses with the presupposition of use theories as 
the theory of meaning because I consider that, compared with other theories of 
meaning, use theories are more likely to be true. According to use theories, to 
determine a meaning is to find out how a speaker uses a linguistic expression, that is a 
word or a sentence, to mean something in actual communicative circumstances in daily 
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life. Thus a linguistic meaning is fixed once its use in a certain practical setting is laid 
out. 
4 .2 A Summary of the Main Arguments and Results 
1.1 have presented in the essay four specific senses of the sociality thesis, namely the 
contractarian view, the uniform response view, the background information view and 
the communication view. All four views are supposed to support the general sense of 
the sociality thesis in different ways, and all have critical shortcomings. 
2. The contractarian view holds that meaning is determined by two or more parties who 
have agreed in advance on what the meanings are. As I have framed the position, a 
contractarian view holder argues as follows. 
First, a private language argument demonstrates the dependence of meaning on 
public criteria, where 'public' means that the criteria are understood not by the speaker 
alone, but also by others. Meaning is possible only when language uses are governed 
by public criteria, because without public criteria for checking if the uses are right, 
there will not be any distinction between correct and incorrect uses. And without such 
a distinction, there will not be any intelligible language use. 
Then the contractarian view proposes to base public criteria on prior agreement. 
This is considered a plausible explanation because a) it is a straightforward model 
accommodating both the factors of public criteria and potential checking, and b) by an 
analogy with other human games, in which all competent participants normally know 
most of the game-governing rules in advance, it suggests how speakers know the rules 
of language-games. 
After presenting the contractarian view, I raise two objections against it. The first 
is that this view does not accurately depict actual communication, in which prior 
agreement on meanings is seldom obtained from all participants. Sometimes we make 
educated guesses on unfamiliar terms and sometimes we just follow other people's 
language use. The second is that the necessary presupposition that speakers can grasp 
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and follow a rule is question-begging, because according to some philosophers such as 
Kripke, there is no such thing as rule-following; thus meaning cannot depend on rules. 
3. The argument against rule-following is roughly as follows. Since there is no fact, 
empirical or mental, in virtue of which one can be justified in determining that one is 
following one rule rather than another, as a result, no deviant interpretation of a rule 
can be categorically excluded. Therefore for any finite number of cases, there are an 
infinite number of rules compatible with the cases. (This can be called the multiple 
interpretation problem.) If the meaning of a term is its rule-governed use, this argument 
shows that there cannot be such rule-dependent meaning. 
Accepting this objection against rule-following, the uniform response view holds 
that if a speaker's responses conform sufficiently to the uniform response exhibited by 
comniimity members on the whole, the members will consider the speaker to mean 
what they mean by various expressions. On this account, meanings are ascribed to 
speakers' utterances by fellow community members as instruments to explain why 
others behave in such-and-such a way, provided the behaviour is in harmony with the 
regular behaviour of the community. 
However, the uniform response view faces two objections, one on its conclusion 
(that meaning is determined by uniform response), another on its argument (that there 
is no such thing as rule-following). The former objection points out that when the 
community-wide response alone is employed to judge whether a speaker utters a word 
or sentence to mean something successfully, it prompts one to wonder who is judging 
the pattern of language use exhibited by the community as a whole. The objection 
reveals that at the community level, there is no way to find out if a widespread and 
consistent pattern of behaviour shared by a community is correct. 
The latter objection points out that even if correctly interpreting a rule in isolation 
is impossible, as Kripke contends, it is possible to rule out eccentric interpretations and 
thus delimit the domain of sense-making patterns of language use for the speakers if a 
background of implicit knowledge is included. The presence of background 
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information eliminates the possibility that rules can be interpreted randomly with 
impunity. Background information includes facts of nature inherent in the world 
speakers live in—for instance, gravitational pull, chemical structures, biological make-
up, and socio-historical events. 
4. The inclusion of background information helps fix meaning because an utterance 
means nothing unless it relates somehow to facts of nature. The facts may refer to an 
object (including another human), an event, some mental state or behaviour, etc. Yet 
once an utterance relates to some facts of nature, Kiipke's sceptical paradox—that a 
word or a sentence in effect means nothing—cannot be true, because the relations to 
facts of nature help delimit the domain in which the use of a linguistic expression 
makes sense to the speakers living within that particular background. The uses of 
linguistic expressions to mean something must be delimited by the background 
provided by the world in which the speaker lives. In other words, the background 
inherent in a particular world helps fix the meanings in that world. 
Such delimitation of sense-making language use involves other people in three 
ways. First, the actual presence of other people or the speaker's relations to others 
constitute part of the background. Second, since background infomiation is always 
public, it is potentially shared by many people. Third, any successful communication 
must be about something in the background shared by the speaker and the hearer. 
The first point concerns the actual presence of other people, while the other two 
points refer to indirect involvement Yet this indirect involvement is important, for it is 
indispensable in explaining why a speaker is able to mean something intelligible not 
only to herself, but also to others. The view that potentially social background 
information plays an essential role in determining meaning is the third specific version 
of the sociality thesis. 
Yet the factor of background information can distinguish only between sense-
making and absurd uses. It alone does not fix the meaning of linguistic expressions 
precisely. 
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5. According to Brandom's strong inferentialism (1994，2000), the meaning of a 
sentence is identified by its broadly inferential articulation, which includes its inferential 
role in reasoning, and its noninferential relations to the circumstances as well as the 
consequences of use. Roughly speaking, the inferential role of a sentence is the relation 
between the sentence, those that can stand as reasons for it, and those it serves a reason 
for. While the noninferential relations of a sentence to the circumstances and 
consequences refer to the propriety of the inference from its circumstances to its 
consequences of use. Therefore, for a speaker to grasp the meaning of a sentence 
implies her ability to use the sentence as a reason for other sentences or as a 
consequence of others, as well as her ability to use it in socially acceptable settings. 
Also, understood this way, meanings are inferentially articulated with each other. 
Whenever a speaker makes a claim, it can be understood from two distinct 
perspectives—the speaker's and the scorekeeper's. From the speaker's perspectives, 
the utterance represents her undertaking of a commitment with respect to certain 
objects, events, behaviour or mental states in her own world. That is, the speaker takes 
what she claims to be correct. And from her perspective, this commitment can serve as 
a reason for further claims. At the same time the hearer (that is，the scorekeeper) 
attributes what the speaker has committed to from his own perspective, that is, to 
attribute what has been said in terms the hearer uses with respect to his own world of 
objects, events, behaviour or mental states, and also keeps score from the 
scorekeeper's own perspective. 
Although both the speaker and the hearer (scorekeeper) need not use words with 
common, shared meanings at any stage of the interaction, communication can be 
possible only if the hearer (scorekeeper) is able to keep track of the speaker's claims (in 
a de dicto sense, from the speaker's point of view) as well as of what the speaker is 
talking about (in a de re sense, from the scorekeeper's point of view). Only in this 
way, can the hearer keep track of what the speaker has committed to (that is, what the 
speaker is talking about) and then evaluate what the speaker is saying. 
62 
According to Brandom's theory, the establishment of meanings for either the 
speaker or the hearer depends on the difference of perspective between both of them. In 
other words, to use a linguistic expression to mean something，that is to talk about 
something in this world, requires this interplay of two distinct perspectives. That 
meaning depends on comimmication that comprises two distinct perspectives 
constitutes the fourth specific sense of the sociality thesis. 
But there is a critical counter-argument that these two socially distinct perspectives 
can collapse into the body of the same person. That is, a person is capable of keeping 
score of what she herself is thinking or speaking so long as she has grasped the implicit 
concepts of commitment and entitlement through discursive practices in a multi-party 
environment. Thus even if the scorekeeping model of meaning-fixing is right, it is not 
true that the meaning-fixing process necessarily involves more than one person. 
I put forward a threefold reply to this objection. First, I point out that social 
articulation, not constant solitary thinking, is the norm. The case of a solitary thinker 
can still be compatible with the sociality thesis if we understand the general sense of the 
sociality thesis as holding that determining the meaning of a linguistic expression 
generally involves at least two parties. The word 'generally' is used to emphasise that 
it is often, not always, the case so. 
Furthermore, I argue that the one-thinker-two-perspectives mode cannot be 
possible unless social articulation is possible. The reason is that the only safeguard 
against the case of a solitary thinker collapsing into the case of a private (and thus 
unintelligible) language user is to claim that the soliloquy of this thinker is potentially 
connectable to public communication (in other words, able to be socially articulated in a 
discursive practice.) However, if this potential for social articulation is required to 
render the solitary-thinker mode intelligible, it amounts to saying that the viability of the 
solitary-thinker mode presupposes its own potential for social articulation. The one-
tliinker-two-perspectives mode is therefore not a challenge to, but interdependent with, 
the different-speakers-different-perspectives mode. 
Last, that solitary thinking presupposes its own potential for social articulation 
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amounts to saying that the solitary thinker must be related to a potential hearer, though 
in an indirect way. This indirect involvement is indispensable in the sense that other 
people's potential presence must be taken into consideration when we attempt to 
explain why the solitaiy thinker's determination of meaning is possible (that is, 
intelligible not only to the speaker, but also to others). 
6. This concludes the summary of the arguments for the four specific senses of the 
sociality thesis, the objections to them, and possible replies. In view of these 
arguments, I am now going to draw some conclusions. 
4 . 3 A Preliminary Conclusion 
1. If 'involvement of at least two parties' as stated in the sociality thesis is understood 
as the actual presence of more than one person, the thesis is probably untenable. It is 
not true that the determination of linguistic meanings requires the involvement of at 
least two parties. As we have seen, there may be cases in which the determination of 
meaning does not require the actual presence of other people aside from the speaker 
herself. 
2. A competent speaker can invent a unique language to mean something successfully, 
without another speaker actually present. This new language need not be a private 
language, which is ruled out by the private language argument. All the speaker is 
required to do is to demonstrate that the uses corresponding to her self-invented 
language are rule-governed. 
Such a demonstration of inle-govemedness can be understood this way. From 
others，’ not the speaker's, perspective, her behaviour constitutes a pattern that is so 
regular that others can discover criteria to describe and predict her supposed regularity, 
as well as to correct what she has said and done in case of deviations. This is also what 
the factor of "public criteria” requires; the criteria can be understood, not by the speaker 
alone, but also by others. 
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However, the demand for "public criteria" only requires that a person's language 
use can be potentially understood by others; it does not require other people's actual 
presence. So a solitaiy speaker who uses a self-invented language constitutes a 
counterexample to the general sense of the sociality thesis. 
3. Among those four specific senses of the sociality thesis discussed in the essay, both 
the contractarian view and the imiform response view (the first and second specific 
senses) are unlikely to be tenable because they cannot answer their objections. 
Furthermore, the proposal of the contractarian view to account for the factor of public 
criteria is unsatisfactory, because, as shown above, being "public" (the potential of 
being understood by others) does not imply being "social" (the actual presence of 
others). 
The communication view (the fourth specific sense) seems initially to be more 
promising, but as the counter-argument shows, the involvement of two parties is not 
necessary. In other words, it does not always require the actual presence of other 
people, as stated in the sociality thesis. 
The background information view (the third specific sense) only states that in 
normal circumstance, the background includes other people. And it requires that if a 
speaker's utterances can be understood by others, both the speaker and her potential 
hearer must share some background information. Yet, this view does not state that for a 
person to be speaking a language, that language must actually be shared with others. 
4. In view of these results, the thesis that the determination of linguistic meaning 
involves at least two persons is refuted, if ‘involve, refers to actual presence. In other 
words, it is all right to claim that in order to determine some linguistic meanings in the 
sense of fixing some particular ways of using these linguistic expressions in practical 
settings, one person is enough. 
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4.4 Additional Remarks on the Conclusion 
1.1 would like to add a few remarks that supplement the above conclusion in two 
respects, first, concerning the difference between the determination of meanings in 
normal circumstances and in unusual situations, and second, concerning the 
consequences of understanding ‘involvement’ in different ways. And I will tiy to 
demonstrate that by taking these two factors into consideration, the sociality thesis can 
stand in a qualified way. 
2. First, it is true that empirical observations strongl)' suggest that a person can acquire 
and then develop linguistic capability only if she is raised by other humans and interacts 
with them for a considerable period. In short, a speaker's capability to use words or 
sentences to mean something is socially cultivated. Second, it is also true that once a 
speaker has already attained a certain level of linguistic skill, she can employ the 
learned skill when she is alone, as in the case when she writes a diary or a novel. She 
can be so confident in using such skill that there is no need for others to be around to 
check if her language uses are correct These two claims are imdispiited. 
The central problem lies in the case where a competent speaker can also make up a 
unique language to mean something by herself. We agree that such a language use must 
be governed by public rules in the sense that the rules can be imderstood (or learned) in 
principle by others, but it does not imply that others' actual presence is required. What 
I want to point out is that such use, though possible, is not a normal (or usual) way of 
language use, if 'normal' (or 'usual') refers to some kind of activity that takes place in 
everyday life. 
In most societies, interpersonal comimmication—in the form of face-to-face 
conversation, through the telephone, writing, or e-mail— is the usual way of using 
common linguistic expressions to mean something to others. The use of a self-invented 
language just for self-reckoning, by contrast, is unusual in the sense that it occurs only 
in special situations. One such unusual example might be a solitary person on a 
deserted island, who creates her own linguistic symbols to record what she thinks or 
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comes across. 
Given such a distinction between usual and unusual language uses, the use of 
self-invented language by a solitary thinker is a special case. Therefore it is still true 
that the general sense of the sociality thesis holds in normal circumstances, that is, 
when a speaker is engaging in ordinary activities in everyday life, the meaning-fixing 
process generally involves another person. For instance, the meanings are fixed largely 
by scorekeeping involving two or more parties, or maybe in a few cases, in the 
contractarian way. 
Other parties are also involved in the "background information view," the third 
specific thesis discussed in the essay. According to this view, what a person means by 
a word or a sentence is delimited by facts of nature (the background). In normal 
circumstances, the existence of other people (for example, the hearer, other community 
members) and the speaker's relations to others (for example, parent/offspring relation, 
worker/colleague relation) are part of this background That is, since the background 
usually comprises facts about social life，when background information is used to fix a 
meaning, the social aspect will be brought into the fixing process. 
In other words, since it is true that the background normally comprises facts 
about the speaker's social life, and such information can help fix linguistic meaning by 
narrowing down which type of language use makes sense to the speaker and the 
hearer, therefore it is also true that the determination of meaning normally involves 
more than one person. 
As a result, the addition of the condition ‘in normal circumstances' helps to 
preserve the sociality thesis by delimiting the scope of the sociality thesis. 
3. The general sense of the sociality thesis can also be preserved in the sense that 
'involvement of at least two parties' need not be understood only as the actual presence 
of more than one person, it can be understood as 'relating to other people in some 
way', although such people are not actually present at the moment of meaning 
determination. I call the former direct involvement and the latter indirect involvement. 
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Here I will consider three cases of indirect involvement with respect to the results of the 
essay. 
First, consider the condition of "public criteria" for language use. To mean 
something is to apply a rule-governed use of a word or a sentence in a practical setting. 
Such rules (or criteria) must be public in the sense that they can be understood by 
others. This potential to be understood by others can be regarded as a relation to other 
people. Since this potential is a necessary feature of the "public criteria" governing 
language uses, therefore, this relation to other people is also necessaiy. 
Furthermore, the background information view argues that for a speaker to use an 
expression to mean something intelligible, what she says is delimited by the facts of the 
background inherent in the world she stays. On the one hand, background information 
normally involves the existence of other people or relation to others (as stated in a few 
paragraphs ago). On the other hand, this background is always public and is potentially 
shared by other inhabitants in that particular world. This potential sharing of a 
background between more than one person can be considered a relation between the 
speaker and others. 
Last, as the third reply to the solitary-thinker objection argues，the soliloquy of a 
solitary thinker must be able to be socially articulated—at least potentially— in a 
discursive practice. Since this potential for social articulation is required to render the 
solitaiy-thinker mode intelligible, the viability of the solitaiy-thinker mode presupposes 
its own potential for social articulation. Therefore a relation to others is necessary, even 
if it is only indirect. 
So in all three cases other people are indirectly involved in meaning determination. 
To understand involvement in an indirect sense (as a relation to other people) may not 
be as strong as understanding it as the actual presence of other people. Nonetheless, 
given this qualification and the previous one, the general sociality thesis that the 
determination of meaning involves at least two parties seems defensible after all. 
4. To sum up, introducing the condition of "normal circumstances" and understanding 
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'involvement' as an indirect relation to others qualify the sociality thesis in such a way 
that in its general sense, it seems tenable. 
4 .5 Postscript: A Suggestion for Further Research 
1. Instead of putting forward suggestions on how to improve this research, which will 
definitely be numerous, I would highlight briefly how my conclusion and the additional 
remains can throw light on the debate between Brandom and his critics during the last 
decade. I would like to draw attention especially to two points: a) the different senses 
of 'social' employed by the opposing sides in the debate’ and this point leads to b) the 
explanatory order of social articulation and the solitaiy-thinker mode, that is, whether 
the possibility of one of them requires that of the other. 
2. For Brandom, ‘social, in social articulation refers to the distinctiveness of 
perspectives, which are necessary for commitment attribution. Thus when he says in 
his scorekeeping scheme that meaning is essentially socially articulated, he is 
emphasising the point that to determine a meaning always requires the interplay of two 
distinct perspectives—the speaker's and the scorekeeper's. His concern is how a 
speaker's claim can be given content, and thus be true or false’ in the scheme he 
expounds. 
In normal circumstance of communication’ these _ distinct peispectives are held 
by two different persons, thus it is true that meaning is socially articulated. For 
Brandom, such a social distinction is also indispensable even when one person is 
making a claim, because a perspective external to the speaker's is necessaiy to relate 
what the speaker says to the world and thus give his claim content In other words，a 
claim can be about the world, and thus said to be true or false，only if it is understood 
from the second-person's de re perspective of the scorekeeper. This shows clearly that 
for Bmndom, 'social' refei^ to the perspect ive /perspec t ive relation 
By contrast，the criticism of Brandom's view as discussed in the essay 
emphasises the point that ‘social’’ as commonly understood, refei. to the actual 
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presence of two or more people during the process of meaning determination; thus one 
person holding two distinct perspectives does not qualify as "social". 
Furthermore, critics like McDowell (1997) point out that the two-speakers-two-
perspectives model Brandom presents need not always apply. For instance, when a 
person makes a first-person noninferential report about the world, her experience is 
already a sufficient condition for her to judge whether her claim about the world is true. 
Obviously, such cases are not social, if 'social' implies the actual presence of at least 
two persons. It shows that what McDowell concerns is the agent/world relation rather 
than the perspective/perspective relation as expounded in Brandom's scheme. 
3. This controversy leads to the second point of concern: the explanatory order of 
social articulation and solitary-thinker mode. Regarding the above criticism, Brandom 
(1997: 192) replies that first of all a speaker is able to make noninferential report about 
the world only if she “has mastered the essentially social discursive deontic 
scorekeeping practice" within which she grasps the concepts of commitment and 
entitlement. In Brandom's view, the distinctiveness of two perspectives as exhibited by 
social articulation is primaiy in the order of explanation. 
Fiirthennore, a scorekeeper's perspective, in addition to the speaker's, is still 
required, as stated above, to make sure that a first-person report is a reliable account of 
the way the world is. In other words, the solitary-thinker mode is possible only if 
social articulation is possible. 
Against this, an opponent (such as Gibbard, 1996) will reply that social 
articulation is possible only if the person himself is capable of functioning in solitaiy-
thinker mode. For instance, for the scorekeeper to keep a correct scoresheet, he must 
be able to identify the cause of the speaker's utterance, and he must identify the cause 
of his own, parallel belief or utterance—so he must be already in touch with the world 
in solitary-thinker mode. Consequent^, solitary-thinker mode cannot be derived from 
social articulation but is fundamental to it. 
Another opponent, McDowell, disagrees with Brandom because he thinks that 
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Brandom's scheme accounts poorly for the world-directedness of empirical content 
(such as in observation reports), as the scheme requires that the authority of any first-
person observation report must be endorsed by another person. In other words, for 
McDowell, Brandom,s scheme does not show that why "the fact that P" cannot 
sufficiently justify a competent speaker's saying that P, while another person's 
perspective must be brought into the picture as a justification. For McDowell, the 
requirement of the external perspective of the scorekeeper to provide content to a 
speaker's claim is unnecessary, because a competent speaker is entitled to use 
expressions to mean something by herself so long as she has acliieved "semantic self-
consciousness." In short, he thinks that a speaker's capability to make reliable flrst-
person reports is self-sufficient and this point is more fundamental than social 
articulation. (McDowell, 1997: 160-2) 
4. The debates on these two points are closely related to the conclusion of the essay. 
First, we have seen that the sociality thesis as stated in the original form will be 
untenable if 'social' is understood as actual presence. And only after two 
qualifications—noimal circumstances and an indirect relation to others— are added, 
can the sociality thesis stand. "Indirect relation to others" is in fact a different sense of 
'social,' since it refers to the potential presence, rather than the actual presence of other 
people. 
If ‘social, is understood in the way Brandom proposes, that is, 'social' means that 
two distinct perspectives are required during meaning determination, putting aside any 
question about the validity of his scorekeeping scheme, his use of ‘social’ is quite 
misleading as 'social' commonly refers to the presence of two or more persons, not 
perspectives. I suppose that Brandom's utmost concern is the difference between 
viewpoints during commimication, or solitary thinking; and I wonder if 'inter-
perspectival' will be a better alternative than 'social' in his scorekeeping scheme. 
Second, my conclusion is also related to the disagreement over whether social 
articulation or solitaiy-tliinker mode is more fimdainental in the explaiiatoty order. 
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Upon an initial brief examination, it seems that the argument from either side is 
reasonable to a certain extent. Thus, one solution is to regard both notions as 
interdependent with each other. It is also the stance I adopt at the end of the essay. I 
take this as a preliirdnaiy suggestion; a further detailed examination of various aspects 
of the debate would be a rewarding topic for further research. 
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